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HomeMy WebLinkAboutAgenda - 04-29-2003-1~c1 m~~ 2 Emergency Management Policy Analysis: An Investigation of the Preparedness and Response Policies of Counties along Interstate-40/85 Corridor in North Carolina Prepared by Kevin J. Bourgault, M.P.P. August 1, 2002 Executive Summary The terrorist attacks of Fa112001 illustrated to the nation the vulnerability of our citizenry to attack. The investigations that followed showed emergency management communities that local and state agencies might not have the personnel or the equipment required for response to a mass casualty event or a weapon of mass destruction (WNID). Though the results were extremely horrifying and disturbing, the effects could have been much, much worse. Had the attacks been more virulent or widespread, the effects may have resulted in the crippling of further response and the possible destabilization of the United States. This study is examines current response and preparedness situations along the Interstate- 40/85 corridor in North Carolina. The study examines potential threats, targets and limiting response factors. Additionally, policies of evacuation and quarantine are examined, providing identification of mitigating factors. This study identifies that: ^ Counties along the Interstate-40%85 corridor do not have adequate licensed bed space available to triage and treat WMD events within the first week of a catastrophic event. ^ Total evacuation of counties within one week in the study area is possible, but is not likely to occur within 24 hours. ^ Large-scale quarantines will not work for large dispersed rural areas or heavily populated urban areas. Bed Snace Table 1 Study area licensed beds measured in potential casualties identified and treated within one week Response Asset County Licensed Beds Potential Casualties Treated Beds Oran a 578 Licensed Beds 578 Durham 1,294 Licensed Beds 1,294 Wake 1,203 Licensed Beds 1,203 Chatham 68 Licensed Beds 68 Alamance 182 Licensed Beds 182 Guilford 291 Licensed Beds 291 Johnston 160 Licensed Beds 160 Total 3,776 Licensed Beds 3,776 Counties along the Interstate-40/85 corridor do not have adequate licensed bed space available to triage and treat WMD events within the first week. A WMD event will infect hundreds if not thousands, and affect thousands if not tens of thousands. For every actual casualty identified, there will also be multiple others convinced that they have been infected or exposed and that they are facing imminent death. Without the ability to immediately diagnose potential patients, hospitals and care centers will be forced to house and process all patients that present signs or complain of symptoms. Under optimal conditions, the study area has 3,776 beds licensed beds. However, the actual figures for the availability of these beds is in reality much lower. First, some of these beds are already in use by other patients. Current occupancy rates for these beds hovers around 50%. Second, some of the licensed beds are currently used for other purpose (i.e., storage and office space). Though assets could be easily reclaimed, it might take up to 48 hours. Third, not all beds are identical substitutes. An OB/GYN or a psychiatry bed is not equivalent to an Emergency Department (ED) bed. Finally, in cases of virulent biological infections (e.g., smallpox) each bed must be separated in a negatively pressured environment, further depleting availability of this resource. Evacuation Table 2 Study area populations by county 2000 Census Coun Po ulation Orange 118,227 Durham 223,314 Wake 627, 846 Chatham ~ 49,329 Alamance 130,800 Guilford 421,048 Johnston 121,965 Total 1,b92,529 Total evacuation of all counties in the study area is possible within one week, but is not likely to occur within 24 hours. Using the North Carolina Department of Transportation estimate of 2,000-passenger cars/lane/hour on a 3-lane Interstate, total evacuation would take S.f days, assuming that all interstate lanes would be directed for outbound traffic. Evacuation schedules could be accelerated if traffic flows were directed away from a central impact area allowing populations the choice to leave from either direction or if only a partial evacuation was implemented. However, it is likely that recent commercial and residential development would create gridlock areas and drastically hinder any attempt to leave. Other problems are also likely. Fleeing populations do not know where to go after they have been directed to leave. To date, destination centers for displaced urban areas have not been identified or prepared. Additional difficulties occur in the cases of nuclear and radiological emergencies. In these situations populations would need doses of Potassium Iodide (KI) distributed either through regional centers or through personnel at key interstate sites. While the medication is available, distribution plans are undeveloped. Quarantine Large-scale quarantines will not work for large dispersed rural areas or heavily populated urban areas. Quarantine requires massive amounts of funding and logistical resources (e.g., law enforcement personnel). At present the study area does not have the law enforcement or financial resources at its disposal to perform quarantine. Coupled with the facts that there are over 200 identified egress routes, a percentage of the population is armed, and that ii M law enforcement agencies do not regularly exercise quarantines, it is doubtful that law enforcement agencies within the study area could manage a quarantine in an area any larger than a housing complex or small rural community. The study area needs to examine and advocate for an amendment to the Posse Comitatus M Act, specifically concerning biological infections. This act currently prevents military forces from performing domestic law enforcement actions. Without the aid and manpower from military resources counties within the study area will not be able to maintain law and order or deliver vital services to those in need. iii