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HomeMy WebLinkAboutCFE 030899 Orange County Environment and Resource Conservation Department P . O . Box 8181 Hillsborough, NC 27278 Phone : 919 - 732-8181 or 919- 967 - 925 "1 x2597 " Fax : 919 - 644- ) 002 AL Email : ercd (c1) co . orancYe . nc Tus Memorandum MAR 1° To : Commission for the Environment From : David Sta nci I �S Environment and Resource Conservation Director Date : March 1 , 1999 Re . March 8 Meeting Agenda Please find attached the agenda and materials for the next meeting of the Commission for the Environment , scheduled for : Monday, March 8 , 1999 7 : 30 p . m . Southern Human Services Center Homestead Road , Chapel Hill , NC At this meeting we will have a status report on the Shearon Harris expansion plans , with special guest Mary MacDowell , and review a resolution on the Wastewater Treatment Monitoring Program , which was presented at the last meeting . We will also have longer breakout sessions , so that committees may spend time on their projects and areas of interest . If you have questions , or will be unable to attend , please contact me at the numbers or e - mail above . I look forward to seeing you on the 8th . AGENDA Orange County Commission for the Environment ( CFE ) Monday, March 8 , 1999 7 : 30 p . m . Southern Human Services Center Homestead Road Chapel Hill , NC 7 : 30 I . Call to Order ( Dr . Loraine Kohorn , Chair ) 7 : 30 II . Additions or Changes to Agenda 7 : 32 III . Approval of Minutes ( February 8 , 1999 ) 7 : 35 IV . Approval of Wastewater Treatment Management Program Letter On February 8 , plans were presented for expanding this program . A draft letter will be considered . 7 : 40 V . County Resource Acquisition Program David Stancil will outline a proposed process and work to date . 7 : 55 VI . Update on Nuclear Waste Storage Pools at Shearon Harris - Mary MacDowell Mary MacDowell ( nuclear issues consultant to Chatham County ) will discuss status . The report from consultant Gordon Thompson , is attached . 8 : 15 VII . Further Discussion of 1999 Goals / Tasks 8 : 45 VIII . Committee Meetings Extended breakout time will be provided for committees to work on projects . In particular , the Air Quality group needs to meet to discuss the County Bike Plan and the Air Quality Action Plan . 9 : 30 IX . Reports From Subcommittees 9 : 45 X . Adjournment ORANGE COUNTY COMMISSION FOR THE ENVIRONMENT DRAFT Summary of Meeting Fourteen , February 08 , 1999 Held in Orange County Southern Human Services Center , Chapel Hill , NC (Prepared by Adhir Kackar, Planner I , Orange County Planning Department) Members Present : Roy Fortmann, William Glaze , Annette Jurgelski , Loraine Kohorn, Rosalinda Lidh, Daniel Okun, Richard Pratt, Kris Price , Lee Rafalow, and Jane Sharp -MacRae . Excused Absences : Commissioner Alice Gordon Guests : R. J Beaty, News of Orange ; Ron Holdway, Environmental Health Director ; Rosemary Summers , Orange County Health Director ; Dr . Carole Crumley and Earl Fowler, County residents ; Paul Thames , County Engineer . Staff Present : , David Stancil , Director, Department of Environment and Resource Conservation ; and Adhir Kackar, Planner I . I . Call to Order Chair Loraine Kohorn, called meeting to order at 7 * 40 PM . II. Consideration of Additions of Changes to the Agenda Jane Sharp MacRae requested that the agenda be amended so that she could present information regarding the Town of Chapel Hill ' s compressed natural gas ( CNG) mobile source emissions grant . Chair Kohorn also suggested that the agenda be amended so that David Stancil could report on Dr . Crumley ' s landfill letter, and the Orange County Profile . Discussion of these issues was added as items 4 and 5 on the evening ' s agenda. III . Approval of January 11 , 1999 minutes The following changes to the minutes were approved : Dan Okun noted that there were two section IV ' s in the minutes and should be changed accordingly . Also , Okun suggested that the reference to Tim Watson, page 2 , be changed to read Jim Watson . IV. Chapel Hill ' s Mobile Source Emission Grant Jane Sharp -MacRae reported that Bill Terry and Cal Horton have prepared a mobile source emissions grant for Chapel Hill . According to Mrs . Sharp -MacRae, Chapel Hill is requesting money for 2 CNG powered Crown Victoria automobiles and a bi - fuel powered pickup truck . The vehicles will be used by the Parks and Recreation, Public Works and Police Departments . In addition the grant money will go toward the creation of a fuel station . In response to Roy Fortmann ' s question about cost sharing under the grant, Sharp-MacRae mentioned that there are two options being suggested . Under option 1 , the Town of Chapel Hill would provide $ 105 , 000 of the grant and NC DENR would provide $ 61 , 000 . Under option 2 , the Town of Chapel Hill would provide $ 130 , 400 of the grant and NC DENR would provide $ 69 , 000 . Roy Fortmann inquired if the grants would be awarded in March . Sharp -MacRae mentioned that she understood the award date to be next March . Fortmann added that he would like to develop a grant proposal by April/May so that it could be incorporated into the BOCC budget . David Stancil indicated that the earlier a grant application is prepared, the greater the likelihood that it could be incorporated into the budget process . Jane Sharp -MacRae reported that Marty Mandell is preparing a grant to train high school students to convert gas powered automobiles to CNG or bi-fuel power . Mrs . Sharp -MacRae was unsure of the funding levels requested and will call for more information . V. Letter from Carole Crumley and Orange County Profile David Stancil reported that that Dr . Carole Crumley, a professor of Anthropology at UNC , has provided a letter expressing concern that historic structures and the natural flora and fauna of the Greene Tract is being threatened by the possible siting of a materials recovery unit on the Green property . The concerns of Dr . Crumley are expressed in the attached letter (see attachment A) . Stancil indicated that he was bringing this issue to the CFE ' s attention at the request of Dr . Crumley . Stancil then summarized the Orange County Profile document According to Stancil , the Profile is a statistical databook that summarizes data that has been collected by ERCD staff and community members during the Shaping Orange County ' s Future effort . Stancil indicated that copies of the profile will be provided to the CFE and placed on the SOCF web page . Roy Fortmann added that the Board of County Commissioners (BOCC) has adopted the CFE ' s resolution for the creation of a County Ozone Action Plan . Stancil indicated that staff will meet soon to discuss a plan of action, and that the CFE will be kept apprised . VI . Report from the Commissioners Retreat David Stancil reported that the BOCC held their winter retreat on January 16 , 1999 . Following is a summary of his comments . The BOCC retreat was a facilitated brainstorming session during which the Commissioners developed goals for 11 areas : Communications , Innovation & Efficiency , Impacts of Growth and Development, Economic Development, Planning , Transportation, Open Space and Recreation and Parks , Rural Character Preservation, Education : Equitable School Funding , Public Safety issues concerning nuclear waste storage at Shearon Harris , District Elections for County Commissioners , and Other (covering issues of Y2K compliance , human service issues , etc . ) . The BOCC had received the goals of the CFE, as established during the January meeting . There will be a commissioners work session next Monday to complete goal setting and to provide direction to County staff. More concrete information regarding BOCC goals may be available at the next CFE meeting (March 8 , 1999 ) . VII . Report on Tour of Shearon Harris David Stancil debriefed the CFE on the January 25 , 1999 tour of the Shearon Harris Nuclear plant, and noted that two other attendees were present, County Engineer Paul Thames and Health Director Rosie Summers . Stancil felt that the tour targeted the concerns expressed by the CFE in terms of allowing representatives to spend time in the waste storage pool facility . Many questions were asked about the storage process and the long -term storage plans . Based on comments from CP &L staff, Stancil indicated that CP &L does not plan on accepting future waste from non- CP &L operations . For the sake of brevity , the following section of the minutes will summarize the questions and comments posed by CFE numbers to David Stancil , Paul Thames , and Rosie Summers . Rafalow : What safeguards are in place at Shearon Harris ? Stancil: According to CP &L there is little threat of a storage -pool waste accident expanding beyond the confines of the Shearon Harris facility . Jurgelski: A report on public radio stated that there was limited interest in the expansion of waste pools at the plant based on the level of attendance at the tour . What this something put out by CP & L ? Fortmann : Similar stories were in the newspaper : Thames : There were 6 local government officials and 14 CP &L staff at the tour Jurgelski : Will there be a public hearing on the CP &L ' s permit application? Thames : The BOCC is making a decision regarding whether to intervene in the permitting process . The county has hired a consultant to review CP &L ' s permit application and will be speaking , during the BOCC ' s 2/9/99 work session, to which CP &L has been invited . During the work session the public can submit questions in written form to the Commissioners . Rafalow : What permitting questions or decisions are ahead ? Thames : If issued, the permits will let CP &L begin storing waste in all (4) of their storage pools . Rafalow: Will the waste come from other utilities ? Thames : Storage for high level nuclear waste is at a premium . Even if the NRC opens their own ikely use storage space at Shearon Harris for its own waste . facility , CP &L will more than l Price : How many years of storage do the pools have ? Thames : The existing waste pools can store waste for up to two more years . If Shearon Harris is allowed to expand, then they will have the ability to store waste unti12056 . MacRae : What was the condition of the cement in the waste pools ? Thames : The pools currently contain water Kohorn . Where are the pools located ? Thames . The pools are located in a separate building away from the core , so as to minimize the potential for contamination . The primary safety concern associated with the pools is that the cooling water in the pools will leak, destabilizing the rods in the pools , and possibly leading to a fire which would result in the release of radioactive particulate matter . Additionally , there have been concerns regarding the effectiveness of the redundancy and back-up systems in place at Shearon Harris to minimize the possibility of such accidents . Kohorn : Have there been any strange accidents , such as what you have described? Thames : There have been incidents of racks being dropped, but none where the loss of water in the pools has resulted in a fire . CP &L feels that given that the rods are cool fuel they pose a low risk . Kohorn : What is the level of risk that a Shearon Harris would retain if their waste is shipped to the proposed national repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada? Thames : With the closure of a plant, for instance Shearon Harris , all of the remaining material would have to be decontaminated or moved to Yucca Mountain, if that is to be the final spot . Summers : Whenever facilities are decommissioned, they must be returned as if they had never been constructed . MacRae : Was there any mention of covering the plant with cement and dirt if and when it is closed ? Summers : No . Rafalow : Is possible that a private company could purchase the plant? If so how would that impact the permit that Shearon Harris is applying presently applying for? Thames . I have no idea. Concerns have been expressed that if deregulated the nuclear industry faced with monetary losses will become less concerned with safety . Kohorn : What is the BOCC doing tomorrow (2/9/99) ? Thames . CP &L is seeking a modification to its permit . This proposal was submitted to the NRC on 12/24/98 . NRC published notice of this application on 1 / 13 /99 . Additionally, the NRC has found that the expansion of waste storage pools does not pose harm . The public has 30 days to comment from when the NRC published their notice . To comment the public needs to establish legal standing that they have the right to intervene in the permitting process . The BOCC will be voting upon intervention on 2/9/99 , at which point they will hear from a consultant evaluating CP &L ' s permit application and the County Attorney . If they decide to proceed with intervention, an administrative law judge will determine if their concerns are valid enough to deny the CP &L permit . This is a legal proceeding similar to a trial and may last 3 months . The public can appeal the judges decision by going to the NRC . Any appeal of the NRC goes to the US District Court . Jurgelski : Have Wake or Durham done anything ? Thames : Wake has looked into the Shearon Harris permit . Based on the evaluation of their Environmental Review Board Durham had elected not to intervene . Chatham Co . has asked that the public comment period be extended . Rafalow : Has Orange County staff made a formal recommendation? Thames : Not formally. Kohorn : Does an increase in the storage capacity of the pools translate to an increased rate of acceptance of fuel rods ? Thames : CP &L has to increase their storage capacity . The method used to store dry versus wet racks does not differ in terms of risk, according to the NRC , the only differentiation is in terms of cost . As a result CP &L is asking to expand their storage facilities . Kohorn : Is the risk posed by the fuel rods increasing as the pools are expanding ? Thames . From what I understand risk has less to do with storage and more to do with transfer of the rods and the proximity of the pools to the core . The BOCC has not made any decision on the "goodness " of CP &L ' s plan . They are motivated by the desire to have a more open permitting process . The present permit process allows for public input, but only in an adversarial manner . CP &L is sensitive about the fact that local government ' s have not taken a stand against their permit on substantive grounds . MacRae : How much closer are the racks expected to be ? Thames : That is proprietary information that we do not have knowledge of. Kohorn : Will expansion increase the storage density of the rods ? Thames . Yes . Kohorn : Will increased density mean increased risk? Thames : That is a concern . MacRae : So if they store rods further apart then there is less of a risk . Rafalow : What is appropriate for CFE to do under the circumstances . Pratt: Will the consultant file a report? Thames : The consultant will present his findings on 2/9/99 . Whether or not a published report will be done is uncertain at this time . If a report is prepared it will most likely be released by the end of February . Pratt: Is the consultants evaluation based on site - specific or general area information? Thames : A combination of both, most likely . Fortmann : This Commission should indicate their support for the actions of the BOCC . Jurgelski : In the resolution that was drafted last meeting we asked for a public hearing to be held, has that occurred ? Thames : If an Administrative Law Judge accepts the concerns of the public as valid then a hearing will take place . Jurgelski : So the BOCC is doing what we asked them to do ? Stancil: Yes . Kohorn : Does Annette ' s statement preclude acting of Roy ' s suggestion? Jurgelski : No . Fortmann : I make a motion to draft a statement of support for the BOCC . The following statement was drafted by David Stancil , and approved unanimously by the CFE . The CFE also proceeded to thank Paul Thames for his work, as suggested by Jane Sharp MacRae . «Insert daft resolution > VIII . Wastewater Treatment Management Program (WTMP ) Expansion Proposal. Rosemary Summers and Ron Holdway of the Orange County Health and Environmental Health Department made presentations on the establishment of a Wastewater Treatment Management Program . For information regarding their proposal , see the attached handout, provided to CFE members by Summers and Holdway . Following the presentation of Summers and Holdway, CFE members posed the following questions . Rafalow : How will program costs be paid? Holdway: A portion of program fees will be paid through the general fund, and the remainder through annual operation permit fee . Pratt: What about community well systems , are they not also a threat to public and environmental health? Holdway : Community systems are recognized as a concern, but they haven ' t been included in this program since they serve only 5 % of the county . Glaze : What defines a critical area? Stancil: In the County , a critical area is generally defined as the area one -half mile from the normal pool elevation of a water supply impoundment . Glaze : Have there been case studies showing the type of effluent emitted from a septic system, and if such effluent type differs with the age of a septic system . Holdway : There have been no such studies , to my knowledge . Stancil: What is the next step in the process ? Holdway : The proposal goes to the BOCC on March 9 , 1999 . Stancil : How long will it take to inspect septic tanks in the critical areas ? Holdway: We estimate 2 years . Pratt: What does an inspection entail ? Holdway: An inspection involves looking at solid depths of tanks , filter inspection, assessment of drainline and repair area . Pratt: What about a percolation report? Holdway : If a repair is needed then a percolation report is undertaken . Pratt. How long will an inspection take ? Holdway: An inspection will take 1 - 2 hours on average , and 34 per day . Pratt. Are the location of systems being recorded through GPS ? Holdway : GPS is in use . Glaze : Of the possible program options which one is being recommended ? Holdway: The Board of Health has recommended option 3 . Summers : Factors in the Board of Health ' s recommendation include : protecting groundwater ; criticism of prior wastewater management programs as being burdened by inspections , a desire to educate , and the number of resources available for program delivery . Rafalow : Given that this is an educated county why do we need a program such as this , wouldn ' t a pamphlet work just as well ? Summers : Despite the fact that we have an educated community , three still exists a need for targeted education so that behavior can be changed . Glaze : I am getting the feeling that the creation of a management program is not a critical area . Summers : You are correct we are not in a crisis , but the goal is to be proactive . Glaze : Who pays is the issue . The idea is that since we all use surface water we should all pay . Holdway : That is the motivation, behind this cost sharing approach . Glaze : This is the opposite of the polluter pays principle . What I have questions about is the use of the general fund . Summers : In municipalities money comes from the general fund , polluters will pay more that those in municipalities , but will not bear the whole cost . Kohorn : Will work be done with the commercial septic providers and repairers ? Holdway: Commercial septic providers are licensed by the county and the state . The Orange County health department does work with them . Glaze : Will the education component of the program include directions for the an individual to repair and/or install their systems ? Holdway: The Orange County Environmental Health department supervise persons who install their own systems . Glaze : This program represents a good step forward for the County . Summers : We appreciate and welcome the support of the CFE on make this program a reality . Jurgelski : Do you need a resolution of support? Fortmann Will cost estimates be developed by March 9 , 1999 ? ill be spent on determining the cost of the program . Summers : The first year of the program w Kohorn : I would like to see verification that the expense of this program is warranted given expected water quality gains . Pratt: The WMTP is an excellent idea, septic tanks would be a good indicator of water quality . Jurgelski : We should amend the resolution of the CFE so that persons with septic systems bear the cost of inspection and repair . Rafalow : My concern is that a segment of the population will scream bloody murder with mandated septic inspections . Glaze : That seems like a BOCC concern not necessary a CFE concern. We know that geology has created a need for septic inspections , thus is it necessary to do a cost benefit analysis . Rafalow: This is more than just cost, political acceptance has an impact on long term viability Okun : We are lucky to not have to deal with package treatment plants . Glaze : If we require a cost benefit we may be killing this project . Kohorn : What if we drafted a resolution before the next CFE meeting ? Glaze : I will draft a resolution and share it with the group via email . Kohorn : Send comments to William and he will pass the resolution to me and I will pass it along to the Commission and David prior to the next CFE meeting . IX. Review of Priorities from the January . Loraine Kohorn began discussion by asking CFE if they wanted to make any changes to the resolutions drafted at the January meeting . Rafalow mentioned that he did not notice sustainability indicators as a priority . Stancil remarked that, because of time , the SOCF Task Force is not going to do further with indicators . Instead, the current thinking is to forward the report and indicator measurement assessement to the towns and Orange County for further development . Annette Jurgelski asked if the Commission would be assigning tasks . To this Stancil suggested that the CFE receive BOCC feedback and then develop a draft work program . Kohorn agreed that input from the BOCC would be beneficial . Stancil concluded comments , by suggesting that the CFE review the ERCD status report in the next month to assist in determining their priorities . X. Committee Breakout Sessions . The Air Quality , Biological Resources and Environmental Education Committee met separately for 15 minutes . Following the breakout sessions the committees reported as follows . The Air Quality Committee mentioned that : 1 ) it will get and share more information regarding Bill Terry ' s work in Chapel Hills 2) meet with persons in North Orange to discuss possibilities of pursuing CNG powered vehicles and fuel stations ; 3 ) will talk with the NC DOT regarding the development of bike lanes and 4) work on developing an Air Quality Status report . The Biological Resources Committee reported that they are currently watching activities at Pickard ' s Mountain . The Education committee reported that the have developed a web page and would like persons to assist with writing prose for the page . Loraine Kohorn indicated that she would write a section on Biodiversity for the page . Roy Fortmann agreed to do the same regarding air quality as did Richard Pratt, with respect to water quality . Once the contributions are completed, Rafalow will send the page to the County webmaster who will place it on the web so that CFE members could view it and make suggestions . Rafalow closed discussion by asking for input on additional topic areas that could be included on the web page . XI . Adjournment. The meeting adjourned at 10 * 20 PM . The next meeting will take place on March 8 , 1999 in the Southern Human Services Center, Homestead Road, Chapel Hill . 1 February 15 , 1999 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE NRC STAFF In the Matter of ) CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT ) Docket No . 50400 ( Shearon Harris Nuclear ) Power Plant) ) DECLARATION OF DR. GORDON THOMPSON I, Gordon Thompson, declare as follows : A. Introduction 1 . I am the executive director of the Institute for Resource and Security Studies (IRSS ) , a nonprofit, tax-exempt corporation based in Massachusetts . Our office is located at 27 Ellsworth Avenue, Cambridge , MA 02139 . IRSS was founded in 1984 to conduct technical and policy analysis and public education, with the objective of promoting peace and international security, efficient use of natural resources , and protection of the environment . 2 . This Declaration pertains to an application by Carolina Power and Light (CP&L) for an amendment to Facility Operating License No . NPF - 63 , which covers the Shearon Harris nuclear power plant. The staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has reviewed CP &L ' s application and proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. The NRC has sought public comments on the proposed determination. ' Through this Declaration, I offer comments on the NRC staff s proposed determination. I have prepared these comments pursuant to an agreement by IRSS to provide technical information and other services to Orange County, North Carolina . B . My Professional Background 3 . I received an undergraduate education in science and mechanical engineering at the University of New South Wales , in Australia. Subsequently, I pursued graduate studies at Oxford University and received from that institution a Doctorate of Philosophy in mathematics in 1973 , for analyses of plasmas undergoing thermonuclear fusion. During my graduate studies I was associated with the fusion research program of the UK Atomic Energy Authority , 4 . During my professional career, I have performed technical and policy analyses on a range of issues related to international security, energy supply, environmental protection, and sustainable use of natural resources . Since 1977 , a significant part of my work has consisted of technical analyses of safety and environmental issues related to nuclear facilities . These analyses have been sponsored by a variety of nongovernmental organizations and local, state and national governments , ' Federal Register : January 13 , 1999 (Volume 64 , Number 8) , pages 2237-2241 . 2 predominantly in North America and western Europe . Drawing upon these analyses , ided expert testimony in legal and regulatory proceedings , and have served I have prov on committees advising US government agencies . My CV is provided here as Attachment A . co Scope of My Review 5 . In preparation of this Declaration, I reviewed the NRC ' s Federal Register notice for the proposed license amendment, the Final Safety Analysis Report for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, the Final Environmental Statement related to the operation of Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 (NURE& 0972 , October 1983 ) , and CP &L ' s application for the proposed license amendment. I also reviewed various correspondence and technical documents relating to the propose license amendment and to risks of spent fuel storage , which are _ identified below . 6 . The information that has been provided by the NRC and CP & L to date does not contain all of the detail that I would need to provide a complete , final statement about the hazards associated with the proposed license amendment . I would expect to review the full body of detailed evidence and present my final evaluation in the context of a hearing . However , even the limited information provided so far is adequate to permit me to identify serious safety concerns which preclude the NRC from making a "no significant hazards" determination . These issues should be addressed through the systematic , public process that a prior licensing hearing can provide . D . The " No Significant Hazards " Standard 7 . The NRC has stated its standard for determining that a . license amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration . 2 The standard is met if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not : ( 1 ) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated ; or (2 ) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated ; or (3 ) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety . 8 . In my professional opinion, based on the preliminary evidence provided by the NRC and CP & L , operation of the Shearon Harris plant in accordance with the license amendment proposed by CP & L will violate all three of the conditions set forth in the preceding paragraph . Therefore , the NRC staff should reverse its position and should determine that CP & L ' s license amendment request does not involve no significant hazards consideration . E . The License Amendment in Context - Spent Fuel Management at Harris 9 . Before discussing my concerns about the safety implications of the proposed license amendment, I provide here some background information about spent fuel management at the Hams plant and CP &L ' s proposal to increase the spent fuel storage capacity at Harris . Unless specified otherwise, the information presented here is drawn from CP &L ' s license amendment application or from CP &L ' s Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the Harris plant . 2 Ibid . 3 10 . The Harris plant features one pressurized-water reactor (PWR) . The core of this reactor contains 157 fuel assemblies , with a center- center distance of about 8 . 5 inches . The Harris plant was to have four reactors but only one was built . A fuel handling building was built to serve all four reactors . This building contains four fuel pools (A, B , C , D ) , a cask loading pool and three fuel transfer canals , all interconnected but separable by gates . Pools A and B contain fuel racks . Pools C and D are flooded but do not contain racks . The cooling and water cleanup systems for pools C and D were never completed . 11 . Pool A now contains six PWR racks ( 360 fuel assembly spaces) and three BWR racks (363 spaces) , for a total pool capacity of 723 fuel assemblies . Pool B contains twelve PWR racks ( 768 spaces) and seventeen BWR racks (2 , 057 spaces) , and is licensed to store one additional BWR rack ( 121 spaces) , for a total pool capacity of 2 , 946 fuel assemblies . Thus , pools A and B now have a combined capacity of 3 , 669 fuel assemblies . The center- center distance in pools A and B is 10 . 5 inches for PWR fuel and 6 . 25 inches for BWR fuel . 12 . Pools A and B store spent fuel from the Harris reactor and from CP &L ' s Brunswick plant and Robinson plant . The Brunswick plant has two boiling -water reactors (BWRs) while the Robinson plant has one PWR . Shipment of spent fuel from Brunswick and Robinson to Harris is said by CP & L to be necessary to allow core offload capacity in the pools at Brunswick and Robinson . 13 . CP &L seeks an amendment to its operating license so that it can activate pools C and D at Harris . By activating these pools , CP &L expects to have sufficient spent fuel storage capacity for all four CP &L reactors (Harris , Robinson and the two Brunswick reactors) through the end of their current operating licenses . 14 . CP &L . plans to install racks in pool C in three campaigns (approximately in 2000 , 2005 and 2014) , to create 927 PWR spaces and 2 , 763 BWR spaces , for a total pool capacity of 3 , 690 fuel assemblies . Thereafter, CP & L plans to install racks in pool D in two campaigns (approximately in 2016 and at a date to be determined) , to create 1 , 025 PWR spaces . Thus , the ultimate capacity of pools C and D will be 4 , 715 fuel assemblies . The center-center distance will be 9 . 0 inches for PWR fuel and 6 . 25 inches for BY R fuel . 15 . The PWR racks in pools C and D have a smaller center- center distance than the racks in pools A and B (9 . 0 inches instead of 10 . 5 inches ) . This arrangement allows . more PWR fuel to be placed in a given pool area but also means that PWR fuel in pools C and D is more prone to undergo criticality . In response , CP &L proposes to include in the Technical Specifications for Harris a provision that PWR fuel will not be placed in pools C and D unless it has relatively low enrichment and high burnup . 3 F . Some Technical Safety Issues Raised By the Proposed License Amendment 16 . CP &L ' s plan for the activation of pools C and D raises a variety of technical safety issues . This section of my Declaration describes some of those issues . Later parts of the Declaration relate these issues to the NRC ' s standard for a " no significant hazards " determination . I3 License amendment application , Enclosure 5 . 4 17 . NRC regulations require that spent fuel storage pools must be cooled by safety grade cooling systems . When the Harris plant was designed , the intention was that pools C and D would be cooled by the component cooling water (CCW) system for the second unit of the Harris plant . 4 That unit was never built, and therefore the Unit 2 CCW system does not exist . In the absence of a second CCW system, CP &L plans to cool pools C and D by connecting their cooling systems to the CCW system of the first unit . This system already provides cooling to pools A and B and serves other, important safety functions . Attachment . B provides supporting information , 5 It should be noted that CP &L considered, but has not pursued , the option of cooling pools C and D by a new, independent system that could have had dedicated emergency diesel generators . Attachment C provides information in support of this point . 6 Three significant safety issues are raised by the fact that the spent fuel pool cooling arrangement originally designed for pools C and D of the Harris plant was not completed . These issues relate to the heat loading of the existing CCW system, the load on the existing emergency diesel generators , and the loss of some important quality assurance documentation for cooling piping at pools C and D . 18 . Heat load. According to CP&L ' s license amendment application, the bounding heat load from the fuel in pools C and D will be 15 . 6 million BTU/hour : 7 At present, the CCW system cannot absorb this additional heat load . Thus , CP &L proposes to include in the Technical Specifications for Harris an interim provision that the heat load in pools C and D will not be allowed to exceed 1 . 0 million BTU/hour . g CP &L claims that an additional heat load of 1 . 0 million BTU/hour can be accommodated by the existing CCW system, and that the fuel to be placed in pools C and D will not create a heat load exceeding 1 . 0 million BTU/hour through 2001 . 19 . Apparently , CP &L contemplates a future upgrade of the CCW system, so that the CCW system can accommodate an additional heat load of 15 :6 million BTU/hour from pools C and D . This contemplated upgrade is not described in the present license amendment application. Attachment C indicates that CP &L plans to perform the upgrade of the CCW system concurrent with a power uprate for the Harris reactor . Apparently , a 4 . 5 percent power uprate will be associated with steam generator replacement, and there will be a subsequent further power uprate of 1 . 5 percent . A chart in Attachment C shows that the projected CCW heat load, including the reactor power uprate and the use of pools C and D , will substantially exceed the capability of the present CCW system . 20 . To summarize , CP &L ' s short-term plan (through 2001 ) for cooling pools C and D is to exploit the margin in the existing CCW system , so as to accommodate an additional heat load of 1 . 0 million BTU/hour. CP &L ' s longer-term plan is to upgrade the CCW 4 The Harris pools have their own closed- circuit cooling systems, which can transfer heat to the relevant CCW system through heat exchangers . 5 Attachment B is a portion of a set of viewgraphs (titled " Harris Spent Fuel Pool ' C ' and 'D' Activation " ) shown by CP&L representatives during a meeting with NRC staff on 16 July 1998 . 6 Attachment C is an NRC staff memo about a meeting between CP&L representatives and NRC staff on 3 March 1998 , together with a portion of a set of viewgraphs (titled " HNP Spent Fuel Pool ' C' and 'D' Activation ") shown by CP&L during that meeting . 7 License amendment application, Enclosure 7 , page 5 - 16 . I 8 License amendment application, Enclosure 5 . 5 system, in a manner not yet specified, so as to accommodate an additional heat load of 15 . 6 million BTU/hour. The CCW upgrade must also accommodate an increase in the rated power of the Harris reactor. Attachment B indicates CP &L ' s expectation that the design of the CCW upgrade will commence in mid- 1999 and will be completed in early 2001 , one year after pool C enters service , ilable margin in the existing CCW system while 21 . In order to avoid exceeding the ava cooling pools C and D , CP &L may be obliged to require its operators to divert some CCW flow from the residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchangers during the recirculation phase of a design-basis loss - of-coolant accident (LOCA) event at the Harris reactor . 9 This raises a safety issue because , during the recirculation phase of a LOCA, operation of the RHR system is essential to keeping the reactor core and containment in a safe condition. Both CP &L and the NRC have identified the proposed additional heat load on the Unit 1 CCW system as an " unreviewed safety question, " i . e . , a safety question that has not been previously reviewed by the NRC Staff. 10 It should be noted in this context that exploitation of the margin in the existing CCW system may involve changes in design assumptions that include fouling factors and tube plugging limits . See Attachment C . The discussion of CCW capability which is provided in Enclosure 9 of CP &L ' s license amendment application is insufficient to determine the nature and significance of the assumptions made by CP &L . 22 . Backup diesel generators . The cooling systems for pools C and D will draw electrical power from the electrical systems of the existing Harris plant . If electricity supply to the cooling pumps for pools C and D is interrupted, the pools will heat up and eventually boil . CP&L says that pools C and D will begin to boil after a time period " in excess of 13 hours " , assuming a bounding decay heat load of 15 . 6 million BTU/hour . I I To prevent the onset of pool boiling in the event of a loss of offsite power, the Harris operators may be obliged to provide electrical power to pools C and D from the emergency diesel generators , which also serve pools A and B and the reactor. In the present license amendment application, CP &L does not address the ability of the emergency diesel generators to meet the additional electrical loads associated with pools C and D . CP &L does mention in the Harris FSAR the potential for connecting "portable pumps " to bypass the pool cooling pumps should the latter be inoperable . 12 However, the characteristics , capabilities and availability of such portable pumps are not addressed in the present license amendment application . Meeting the electrical load of pools C and D from the systems of the existing Harris plant is a safety issue because it could increase the probability of design-basis or severe accidents at the Harris reactor or at pools A through C . 23 . Lack of QA documents . Activation of pools C and D will require the completion of their cooling and water cleanup systems , and the connection of their cooling systems to the existing CCW system . CP &L states that approximately . 80 % of the necessary piping was completed before the second Harris reactor was cancelled. 13 However, some of the 9 License amendm6nt application, Enclosure 9 . 10 Ibid; Federal Register notice for this application . 11 License amendment application, Enclosure 7 , page 54 . I 12 Harris FSAR, page 9 . 1 . 34 , Amendment No . 48 , I 13 License amendment application, Enclosure 1 , page 4 . 6 quality assurance documentation for the completed piping is no longer available . Much of the completed piping is embedded in concrete and is therefore difficult or impossible to inspect . To address this situation, CP & L proposes an Alternative Plan to demonstrate that the previously completed piping and other equipment is adequate for its purpose . 14 Nevertheless , the cooling systems for pools C and D will not satisfy ASME code requirements . Attachment D provides supporting information . 15 Failure to satisfy ASME code requirements could increase the probability of design-basis or severe accidents at pools C and D . G . The Degree of Hazard Posed by Spent Fuel Storage at Harris 24 . The NRC and CP &L have performed and published site- specific analyses which provide information about potential severe accidents at the Harris reactor . However, to my knowledge neither NRC nor CP &L has performed any site - specific analysis which examines potential severe accidents affecting any of the Harris fuel pools , including pools C and D . 25 . The NRC examined severe reactor accidents in its Final Environmental Statement for the Harris plant . 16 Site- specific consequence modelling was performed by the NRC for hypothetical accidents that released as much as 82 percent of the inventory of cesium isotopes in the reactor core . CP &L has submitted to the NRC an Individual Plant Examination (IPE) for the Harris plant. 17 In addition, CP &L has submitted a similar analysis (an IPEEE) for " external " initiating events . 18 The IPE and IPEEE studies examined the potential for severe reactor accidents that could release substantial amounts of radioactivity . 26 . In the absence of similar studies for the Harris pools , one must perform scoping calculations to indicate the degree of hazard posed by spent fuel storage at Harris . The degree of hazard is important when one considers the relevance of a safety issue to a determination of " no significant hazards " . If preliminary evidence about a safety issue suggests the potential for accidents with either high probability or large consequences , then the NRC staff should not make a determination of " no significant hazards " . 27 . The radioisotope cesium437 is one important indicator of the hazard potential posed by a nuclear facility . This isotope has a half- life of 30 years , emits intense gamma radiation, and is released comparatively readily during severe accidents . The 1986 Chernobyl accident released about 90 , 000 TBq (27 kg) of cesium437 to the atmosphere , which accounted for most of the offsite radiation exposure attributable to that accident : 14 License amendment application, Enclosure 8 . I 15 Attachment D is a portion of a set of viewgraphs (titled " 1 OCFR50 . 55a Alternative Plan ") shown by CP&L representatives during a meeting with NRC staff on 16 July 1998 . 16 NRC , Final Environmental Statement related to the operation of Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 21, NUFEGm0972 , October 1983 . 17 CP&L , Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Individual Plant Examination Submittal, Final Report, 31 August 1993 . 18 CP&L, Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Unit No . 1 , Individual Plant Examination for External Events Submittal, June 1995 . 7 Official estimates indicate that this exposure will cause 50 - 100 thousand extra cancer fatalities worldwide over the next 70 years . 19 28 . The core of the Harris reactor contains 157 PWR fuel assemblies . At shutdown, this core contains about 155 , 000 TBq (47 kg) of cesium" 137 . 20 When a spent fuel assembly is discharged from the reactor, it will contain more cesium- 137 than the average assembly at shutdown . CP &L plans an eventual , aggregate capacity in the Harris pools of 3 , 080 PWR assemblies and 5 , 304 BWR assemblies . Note that the cesium- 137 content in each BWR assembly will be about one quarter the cesium- 137 content in each PWR assembly, if both assemblies have been discharged for an equal period . 21 After discharge, the content of cesium437 in a fuel assembly will decay exponentially with ahalf--life of 30 years . 29 . As a simplified illustration, assume that all fuel assemblies in the Harris pools have been discharged for an equal period . Further assume that all four pools are full and contain 3 , 080 PWR assemblies and 5 , 304 BWR assemblies . The pools will then contain as much cesium437 as 4 ,406 PWR assemblies . (3 , 080 + 5 , 304 x 1 /4 = 4 , 406) Note that 4 , 406 PWR assemblies represent 28 cores of the Harris reactor. 30 . If an accident can be postulated that releases to the environment a significant fraction of the cesium437 in the Harris pools , then it is clear that the consequences of this accident would be large . The offsite radiation exposure could be an order of magnitude larger than the exposure from the Chernobyl accident . Activation of pools C and D could lead to an accident which creates offsite radiation exposure as much as two times higher than the exposure that would arise from a similar accident involving only pools A and B . H. Loss of Water from Spent Fuel Pools at Harris 31 . Loss of water from one or more of the Harris pools could initiate a release to the environment of a significant fraction of the cesium437 in the pools . This potential exists because the cladding of PWR or BWR fuel is a zirconium alloy which can react exothermically with air or steam . Thus , if the water in a fuel pool is removed and the fuel is partially or totally uncovered, one must be concerned about the possibility of a runaway air- zirconium or steam-zirconium reaction. Such a reaction could release cesium- 137 and other radioisotopes from affected fuel into the fuel building . That building was not designed to contain radioisotopes released during a vigorous exothermic reaction in the pools , and it can be assumed that most of the volatile radioisotopes entering the building from the affected fuel would be released from the building as an atmospheric plume . 32 . Several reports prepared by or for the NRC have examined the conditions under which a runaway zirconium reaction might occur. 22 However, these reports have 19 Allan S Krass, Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident (Cambridge , Massachusetts : Institute for Resource and Security Studies , December 1991 ) . 120 NRC, Final Environmental Statement, page 5 -50 . 21 The ratio of one quarter derives from the parameters shown in the license amendment application, Enclosure 7 , page 545 . 22 Relevant reports include : V L Sailor et al, Severe Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools in Support of Generic Safety Issue 82 , NUREG/CR-4982 , July 1987 ; E D Throm, Regulatory Analysis for the Resolution of Generic Issue 82 , "Beyond Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools " , NUREG = 1353 , April 1989 ; and R 8 concentrated almost entirely on a postulated condition of instantaneous , complete loss of water from a pool . Such a condition is unrealistic in any scenario which preserves the configuration of the spent fuel racks . If water is lost by drainage or evaporation and no makeup occurs , then complete loss of water will always be preceded by partial uncovering of the fuel . If makeup is considered, the water level could fall , rise or remain static for long periods . 33 . Partial uncovering of the fuel will often be a more severe condition than complete loss of water because , during partial uncovering , convective heat loss is suppressed by the residual water at the base of the fuel assemblies . As a result, longer-discharged fuel with a lower heat output may undergo a runaway steam-zirconium reaction during partial uncovering while it would not undergo a runaway air-zirconium reaction if the pool were instantaneously emptied . 34 . I am aware of only one instance in which reports produced by or for the NRC address the hazard posed by partial uncovering , namely in a report prepared for the NRC by Sandia Laboratories and published in 1979 . 23 Part of this report did address a situation of partial uncovering, but used a crude heat transfer model and neglected to consider the onset of a steam- zirconium reaction . Nevertheless , the report found (page 76 ) that an incomplete drainage can potentially cause a more severe heatup problem than a complete drainage , if the residual water remains near the baseplates " . A portion of the 1979 Sandia report is provided here as Attachment E . An internal NRC memo mentions the consideration of partial uncovering in the 1979 Sandia report . 24 . Otherwise , it appears that the NRC has ignored the hazard posed by partial uncovering . This hazard was not reflected in the regulatory analysis whereby the NRC purportedly resolved Generic Issue 82 . 25 3 5 . In a situation of falling water level , a fuel assembly might first undergo a runaway steam-zirconium reaction, then switch to an air-zirconium reaction as water falls below the base of the rack and convective air flow is established . In this manner, a runaway air- zirconium reaction could occur in a fuel assembly that is too long - discharged (and therefore produces too little heat) to suffer such a reaction in the event of instantaneous , complete loss of water . Conversely , a rising water level could precipitate a runaway steam-zirconiurfi reaction in a fuel assembly that had previously been completely uncovered but had not necessarily suffered a runaway air-zirconium reaction while in that condition. The latter point is highly significant in the context of emergency measures to recover control of a pool which has experienced water loss . Inappropriate addition of water to a pool could exacerbate the accident . 36 . The NRC ' s failure to consider partial uncovering of fuel should be borne in mind when one reviews NRC - sponsored reports that purport to address the hazard posed by water loss from a fuel pool . This hazard should be re- analyzed through detailed J Travis et al, A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR and PWR Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants , NUREG/CR= 6451 , August 1997 . 23 Allan S Benjamin et al , Spent Fuel Heatup Following Loss of Water During Storage , NUREG/CR-0649 , March 1979 . 24 Internal NRC Memorandum from J T Han to M Silberberg , "Response to a NRR request to review SNL studies regarding spent fuel heatup and burning following loss of water in storage pool 21 May 1984 . 25 E D Throm , op cit. 9 modelling . The modelling should consider both partial and complete uncovering and the transition from one of these states to the other . Also , the modelling should cover : ( 1 ) thermal radiation, conduction, and steam or air convection ; (2) air-zirconium and steam- zirconium reactions ; (3 ) variations along the fuel rod axis ; and (4 ) radial variations within a representative fuel rod, including effects of the pellet-cladding gap . Experiments will probably be required to support and validate the modelling . 37 . Until the problem of water loss is re - analyzed in this manner, there is no basis for determining when fuel has been discharged for a sufficiently long period that it will not suffer a runaway zirconium reaction in the event of water loss . If the problem were to be properly analyzed through validated models , such a determination could be made within some margin of error, but the determination should consider site- specific factors . For example , the detailed design of a rack might be an important site-specific factor . 3 8 . No determination of this kind has been made for pools C and D at Harris , nor does the methodology now exist to make such a determination. In any case , there is nothing in the license amendment application and its proposed modifications to the Harris Technical Specifications which prohibits the placing of freshly discharged fuel in pools C and D . Reports previously prepared for the NRC concede that freshly discharged fuel can experience a runaway air-zirconium reaction in the event of complete water loss . 39 . A variety of events, alone or in combination, could lead to partial or complete uncovering of spent fuel in the Harris pools . This class of events should be subjected to the kind of systematic analysis that is performed in an IPE and an IPEEE . Relevant events include : ( 1 ) an earthquake, cask drop , aircraft crash, human error, equipment failure or sabotage event that leads to direct leakage from the pools ; (2) siphoning of water from the pools through accident or malice ; (3 ) interruption of pool cooling, leading to pool boiling and loss of water by evaporation ; and (4) loss of water from active pools into adjacent pools or canals that have been gated off and drained . Interactions with the Harris reactor should be considered . For example, a reactor. accident might release radioactivity that precludes personnel access to the plant for purposes of maintaining or restoring pool cooling . I. Increased Probability or Consequences of Accidents Previously Evaluated 40 . The Federal Register notice of this license amendment application claims that the probability of a spent fuel assembly drop or a misloaded fuel assembly is not significantly increased if the license amendment is approved and pools C and D are activated . This claim is false , because activation of pools C and D will roughly double the total number of fuel handling operations to be conducted at Harris . Assuming that the general nature of fuel handling operations continues as before, the probability of a fuel assembly drop or misloaded fuel assembly, integrated over the entire period of the Harris operating license , will increase significantly, by a factor of two . This point has been made by David Lochbaum of the Union of Concerned Scientists , in a 22 January 1999 letter to the NRC Commissioners . A •copy of his letter is provided here as Attachment F . If probability is integrated over the remaining period of the Harris operating license, rather than over its total duration, then activation of pools C and D will more than double the probability of a fuel assembly drop or a misloaded fuel assembly. 41 . A spent fuel assembly drop or a misloaded fuel assembly are members of a broader class of accidents that could arise during the movement of fuel from other CP &L stations to Harris , and during fuel movement within Harris . This class of accidents will include design-basis accidents and severe accidents . Assuming that the general nature of fuel movement continues as before, the probability of accidents in this class , integrated over 10 the entire period of the Harris operating license , will double if pools C and D are activated . If integrated over the remaining period of the operating license , the probability will more than double . 42 . The PWR racks in pools C and D will be safe against criticality for a comparatively narrow range of fuel enrichment and bumup . Thus , assuming that the general nature of fuel movement continues as before , the probability of a criticality accident will be significantly increased if pools C and D are activated . This probability will increase on a per-movement basis , so it will more than double when integrated over the entire period of the Harris operating license . The consequences of a criticality accident may also be significantly increased . 43 . Activation of pools C and D will add to the electrical load and CCW heat load of existing Harris systems . It will also add to the burden of work on the Harris operators . These effects will increase the probability of two categories of design-basis or severe accidents . First, they will significantly increase the probability of accidents associated with the Harris reactor, because the reactor' s CCW and electrical systems and its operators will be under greater stress . Second, they will significantly increase the probability of accidents at the Harris pools that are attributable to interruptions in cooling and electricity supply and to increased operator stress . Also , the inability of cooling piping at pools C and D to meet ASME code requirements could significantly increase the probability of design-basis or severe accidents at these pools . 44 . As mentioned in paragraph 24 above , to my knowledge there has been no site- specific analysis of severe accidents affecting any of the Harris pools . To the extent that such accidents have been previously evaluated, their consequences will be significantly increased by the activation of pools C and D . The fuel storage capacity of these pools will roughly double the storage capacity at Harris , creating the potential for a doubled inventory of radioactivity . Severe accidents could affect some or all of the Harris pools . As I have discussed in paragraph 30 above , the potential doubling of radioactivity in the pools could significantly increase the consequences of severe accidents . J. Possibility of New or Different Kinds of Accident from any Accident Previously Evaluated 45 . To my knowledge , there has been no site - specific evaluation of the probability or consequences of severe accidents at pools A and B at Harris . A variety of severe accidents are possible and should be subjected to the kind of systematic analysis that is performed in an IPE and IPEEE . The NRC has performed evaluations of accidents involving loss of water from fuel pools , generically and for sites other than Harris . However, these evaluations are seriously deficient because they failed to consider partial uncovering of fuel . To summarize , at pools A and B there exists the possibility of new or different kinds of accident from any accident previously evaluated . The same possibility will exist at pools C and D if these are activated . 46 . Provision of electrical power and CCW service from the existing Harris plant to pools C and D could introduce the potential for design-basis or severe accidents that are new or Jdifferent from any accident previously considered . The IPE and IPEEE studies performed for Harris did not address the provision of electrical power and CCW service to pools C and D . As an example of the potential for new or different accidents , the need to provide cooling to pools C and D will place increased stress on the CCW system and the plant operators during a design-basis LOCA . 11 47 . Severe accidents at some or all of the Harris pools could lead to offsite radiation exposure an order of magnitude larger than the exposure from the Chernobyl accident. Activation of pools C and D could significantly increase both the probability and consequences of such accidents . Thus , CP &L ' s proposed license amendment poses a " significant hazard " by any reasonable definition of that term . J. Significant Reductions in Margins of Safety. will create an additional heat load on the existing CCW 48 . Activation of pools C and D system . CP &L proposes to meet this load in the short term by exploiting the margin in the CCW system . In my professional opinion, the reduction in the CCW safety margin caused by the increased heat load is. significant . Both the NRC and CP &L have also recognized that increasing the heat load on the CCW system constitutes an unreviewed in will be especially reduced if, during a LOCA, the safety question . The safety marg operators must divert water from the RHR to the spent fuel pools . This will increase stress on the operators and create opportunities for human error. 49 . As pools C and D become filled and the reactor receives a power uprate, the load on the CCW system will increase further. CP &L offers no assurance that the present margin ill be restored by upgrading the CCW system to accommodate these burdens , of safety w 50 . CP &L proposes to activate pools C and D using cooling systems that will not satisfy ASME code requirements . This action could potentially cause a significant reduction in margins of safety for pool cooling . CP &L ' s Alternative Plan has not been subjected to any public scrutiny or rigorous review. It deserves , at the least, thorough consideration at a licensing hearing before the license amendment is issued . 51 . CP &L proposes to provide electrical service to pools C and D from the existing (Unit 1 ) electrical system at Harris ; having rejected the option of dedicated emergency diesel generators to serve pools C and D . The existing diesel generators already serve the safety systems in Unit 1 and spent fuel storage pools A and B . By adding pools C and D to the load carried by the Unit 1 diesel generators , CP &L would add stress on the diesel generators and on the plant operators . In the event of a loss of offsite power, these effects could significantly reduce the margin of safety at the Harris reactor and the fuel pools . L . Environmental Review 52 . As discussed above, the original design of the Shearon Harris plant called for cooling of spent fuel pools C and D by the Unit 2 CCW system . The FEIS for the operating license presumably based its conclusions on this design. I have seen no analysis by the NRC Staff, either in the 1983 FEIS or in a subsequent Environmental Impact Statement or Environmental Assessment, of the environmental impacts of altering the Shearon Harris design to provide for cooling of pools C and D by the Unit 1 CCW system. M. Conclusions idence presented by the NRC and CP&L , I conclude that 53 . From the preliminary ev operation of the Shearon Harris plant in accordance with the license amendment proposed by CP &L will violate all three of the NRC ' s conditions for a determination of "no significant hazards . ". Therefore , the NRC staff should reverse its position and should determine that CP&L ' s license amendment request does not involve no significant hazards consideration . t 12 54 . The proposed license amendment raises serious safety concerns which deserve prior consideration at a licensing hearing . I declare , under penalty of perjury , that the foregoing facts provided in my Declaration are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and that the opinions expressed herein are based on my best professional judgment . Executed on 12 February 1999 . I Gordon Thompson