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HomeMy WebLinkAboutMinutes - 12-06-2000APPROVED 5115101 MINUTES ORANGE COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS SPECIAL MEETING DECEMBER 6, 2000 The Orange County Board of Commissioners met for a public forum on Wednesday, December 6, 2000 at 7:30 p.m. at the Chapel Hill Town Council Chamber in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. COUNTY COMMISSIONERS PRESENT: Chair Stephen H. Halkiotis and Commissioners Margaret W. Brown, Moses Carey, Jr. Alice M. Gordon, and Barry Jacobs 1. INTRODUCTIONS AND OPENING REMARKS Chair Halkiotis made the opening remarks and welcomed everyone to the forum. The purpose of the forum was to report on the status of CP&L's application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to expand its capacity for stored nuclear waste at the Shearon Harris Plant in Wake County. He welcomed tonight's speaker, Dr. Gordon Thompson, of the Institute for Resource and Security Studies in Cambridge, Massachusetts. He said that two years ago this month, Orange County, with the help of other concerned local governments, mainly Chapel Hill, Carrboro, and Durham County, began its quest to try and shed light on what is a very closed and secretive process. He said that one could only assume, from the experiences over the past two years, that the NRC's permitting process for nuclear power providers, such as CP&L, favors the utility. He said that the Orange County Board of Commissioners has not taken a position on whether or not CP&L should be allowed to increase its spent fuel storage capacity. Given the secrecy of the process it is difficult to determine whether the plan is safe ar not. He said that this Board vigorously opposes any process that would rubberstamp a plan to put the nation's largest repository of highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel rods less than a half hour's drive from the County's border. During this process, CP&L has maintained that their plan is safe and that they have nothing to hide. However, at every turn, CP&L has fought Orange County's attempts to compel the NRC to hold hearings an this important issue. Fortunately for Orange County, it has the expertise of people such as Dr. Thompson. Over the past two years, Orange County has learned that CP&L's plan calls for these dangerous radioactive fuel rods to be stored in a far mare densely packed configuration than the utility currently uses. Orange County has learned that a partial loss of coaling water in the storage pools, which have been unused far years, would have potentially disastrous consequences for this region. Orange County has learned that the use of dry cask storage for the spent nuclear fuel rods would vastly reduce the potential for a nuclear disaster. Orange County has learned that despite all of the evidence that has been presented, the deck is still clearly stacked against the County. Tomorrow morning at 9:30 at the McKimmon Center in Raleigh, Orange County has the opportunity to present its case again. Due to the rules surrounding the process, Dr. Thompson will be prevented from presenting his testimony. The Board finds it ironic that while the approval of a subdivision is done in public, the review of a plan that could result in the release of dangerous radioactive gas over the homes of more than a million people is conducted behind closed doors. This is why the public was invited here tonight. He said that Dr. Thompson would present his latest findings on the potential dangers of the CP&L plan in full. The NRC, the ASLB, and CP&L may not want to hear what Dr. Thompson has to say, but Orange County believes that it is important that the public hears it. 2. INTRODUCTION OF DR. GORDON THOMPSON Commissioner Jacobs introduced Dr. Gordon Thompson. Dr. Thompson received an undergraduate education in Science and Mechanical Engineering in Australia and later studied at Oxford University and received a doctorate in Philosophy and Mathematics in 1973. During his professional career, Dr. Thompson has performed technical and policy analyses on a range of issues related to international security, energy supply, environmental protection, and the sustainable use of natural resources. Since 1977, a significant part of his work has consisted of technical analyses and of safety and environmental issues related to nuclear facilities. Dr. Thompson has a substantial record of experience in addressing the hazards posed by high-density spent fuel pools. Recently, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff agreed with Dr. Thompson's findings about the implications of residual water for heat transfer if water is lost from ahigh-density fuel pool. The staff had previously disputed those findings. Dr. Thompson has been instrumental in crafting three technical and seven environmental contentions, which are the basis of the actions that Orange County has taken. 3. REPORT BY DR. GORDON THOMPSON Dr. Gordon Thompson made a presentation using overheads. He showed a nuclear fuel assembly, the kind that is used at the Shearon Harris plant. The fuel is in pellets, in long, thin tubes made of zirconium metal. Zirconium metal does not corrode ar deteriorate. However, it is a combustible metal and, if exposed to air at high temperatures, it will catch fire and burn vigorously. It also reacts vigorously with steam and will produce hydrogen. He showed the fuel storage building at the Shearon Harris plant and said that there were water-filled pools about 40 feet deep in the building, in which spent fuel is stored. The reason for storing the fuel in the deep pools is to shield workers from the intense radiation that is being emitted from the fuel. Secondly, the fuel is stared in the deep pools to coal the fuel to prevent deterioration. There are pumps circulating the water constantly to keep the water cool. The fuel sits in racks inside the pools. The tubes surrounding the fuel are made of neutron absorbing materials to stop the spent fuel from going critical. If water is lost, the fuel cannot lose its heat and eventually it ignites. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission and CP&L, when he first began talking about this issue in early 1999, initially denied that this could occur. Both parties now agree that if water is lost the fuel will ignite and release radioactivity. He showed a chart of the area of land that would be affected by cesium contamination in the case of an accident. The area of contaminated land would be about 4,000- 5,000 square kilometers. The quantity that could be released from fire in the pools at the Harris plant, could be up to 70 million curies of cesium or higher. A release of 70 million curies would contaminate a land area of about 150,000 square kilometers, which is slightly greater than the land area of North Carolina. This would render the land area uninhabitable for a century or longer. He gave the example of Chernobyl. Dr. Thompson spoke about how water could be lost from the pools at the Shearon Harris plant. One scenario would be an extreme earthquake, causing a cracking of the concrete structure and the drainage of water. Secondly, there could be a drop of a shipping cask. Thirdly, someone could cause a breach in the pool with an explosive charge or could siphon water out of the pool. This would be categorized as an act of sabotage or terrorism. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board has declined to hear evidence on any of these scenarios. They have committed him to discuss one scenario only - an accident occurring at the Harris reactor and some of the radioactivity escaping from the containment. The question is whether the distributed radioactivity around the site will preclude actions necessary to maintain cooling and makeup of water to the pools. This is the scenario that will be discussed tomorrow at the hearing in the McKimmon Center. Lawyers will be talking about this issue based on papers that technical experts have provided. The experts will not be able to speak. There are three parties, Carolina Power and Light, the staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Orange County. CP&L and the NRC say that the probability of the last scenario is sa low that it is not worth discussing. Orange County's position is that it should proceed to an evidentiary hearing and have a detailed cross- examination in an open court setting. Dr. Thompson spoke about the possibility of dry storage of the spent fuel. CP&L has chosen to use high-density wet storage. He believes that this decision is based on the cost of dry storage. He spoke about the probability of an accident at the Harris plant. He said that an accident of this nature would be seen as something on the scale of the Civil War as an historic event. In closing, he said that, at a minimum, this issue should be the subject of an open evidentiary hearing and followed by an environmental impact statement. 4. QUESTIONS ANDIOR COMMENTS FROM COUNTY COMMISSIONERS Chair Halkiotis said that the CP&L staff and the NRC staff have submitted expert reports to the licensing authorities, which conclude that the passibility of a severe spent fuel pool accident is too low to be worthy of consideration. He asked Dr. Thompson why C)range County should believe him rather than the other experts from CP&L and the NRC staff. Dr. Thompson said that when he first came to talk about these issues, bath the NRC staff and CP&L disputed that the pools could suffer a fire at all. The NRC and CP&L has dropped this position and has also dropped apposition to technical arguments that were made about the role of water levels and cooling of pools. He mentioned that the government of a west German state accepted his arguments on this position and ruled that they would not license high-density pawls. He said that this suggests that he has some level of credibility on this issue, sufficient to be allowed to speak at an evidentiary hearing. Cammissianer Jacobs asked for clarification on whether this would be the largest high-level nuclear waste spent fuel repository in the United States. Dr. Thompson said that he believed that this was true. Commissioner Jacobs said that, in speaking with one of CP&L's "hired guns" after one of the hearings, he characterized Dr. Thompson as a "hired gun" that would turn around and argue that dry cask storage was not as safe as pool storage. He asked Dr. Thompson to address the advantages of dry cask storage. Dr. Thompson said that dry cask storage relies on passive cooling. No electricity or cooling water is required for the dry cask storage. By contrast, the pool storage method required an ongoing supply of electricity, cooling water, and maintenance. Commissioner Jacobs asked how Orange County was doing in the process. Dr. Thompson said that Orange County is to be congratulated far taking on this issue and for having the patience to stick with it. He said that Orange County has taken this issue further than any other entity has been able ta. He said that if a hearing occurs it would be a major victory far democratic processes in the pursuit of truth. Commissioner Jacobs asked how close Orange County was to getting to an evidentiary hearing. Dr. Thompson said that the ruling would be made tomorrow by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. He thinks there are powerful arguments favoring an open hearing. Cammissianer Carey said that it seems that wet storage is mare labor-intensive than dry storage. He asked why dry storage would be mare expensive for CP&L. Dr. Thompson said that, from the view of operating casts, dry storage would be cheaper. However, the pools exist, and part of the coaling equipment already exists. He said that the true increment of cast was hard to determine because CP&L could strike a hard bargain with a dry storage company. He would be curious to know the expenditure the company has made on fighting this case. Commissioner Brown asked Dr. Thompson to review his other concerns that the NRC did not want to speak about. Dr. Thompson said that there were several technical and environmental contentions. He said that the normal licensing of nuclear facilities is done under the Atomic Energy Act. Under this act, severe accidents are simply not considered. Eventually, it was recognized in the federal government that severe accidents can and da happen (ex. Three Mile Island and Chernobyl). Legally, this is handled by the National Environmental Protection Act through an environmental impact statement. When he raised the concerns about a severe accident, this was done under the heading of an environmental contention, under NEPO as opposed to the Atomic Energy Act. The licensing board declined to hear the environmental contentions because the staff of the NRC was preparing an environmental assessment. The possibility of a severe accident has always been the most significant concern that he has had. The technical contentions had to do with quality assurance of some piping and with criticality concerns. The board ruled against this on both contentions earlier in the year. Chair Halkiotis said that CP&L has been transporting spent fuel rods by rail from its two nuclear power plants near Southport, NC and Darlington, SC for storage at the Shearon Harris site. He asked if any special precautions were taken right now for the rail shipments. He raised this issue based on the number of rail accidents in this country in the last few years. Dr. Thompson said that there were irregular shipments of spent fuel. The shipments are based on an as needed basis. He said that there was a whole body of regulations far the transport of spent fuel by road or rail. Commissioner Gordon asked far an explanation of how far apart the assemblies were currently, in the proposed configuration, and in a nuclear reactor. She commented on how close the assemblies were proposed to be, namely, almost as close as in a reactor. Dr. Thompson said that the assemblies were side by side in the reactor core. The rack is na longer an open frame rack, but is a closed configuration with neutron absorbing material in the walls of each tube. It is this close packed configuration that causes the fuel to overheat if water is lost. Commissioner Gordon asked for an explanation of how the backup cooling and the nuclear reactor might interact. Dr. Thompson said that the Harris reactor has numerous cooling systems and failure of some of those systems can cause the reactor to suffer a core melt accident. He said that if electricity is lost, then all of the systems fail so that the core will dry out and melt and mayor may not release radioactivity into the environment. The loss of electricity will also interrupt any cooling to the spent fuel pools. Commissioner Gordon said that she was struck by the range of problems that could occur at the plant. Commissioner Jacobs made reference to how the process was stacked against those who want to challenge the NRC. He asked if the NRC staff voluntarily did an environmental assessment or if that was part of what Orange County has argued for to this point. Dr. Thompson said that this was a question for the NRC's attorney. His recollection was that the staff chose itself to perform the environmental assessment. He said that the environmental assessment really said nothing of interest and was like every other that had been produced in the past. Commissioner Brown said that she was concerned about the evacuation plan for the Harris plant. She said that the current evaluation plan was 20 years old. Dr. Thompson said that off-site emergency planning regulations were introduced in 1980 as a direct result of the TMI accident and were based on technical analyses that had been done in 1978. As a result of the requirement, every licensed plant in the country has to have an emergency plan that involves state and local governments. The concern with a pool fire is more towards the long-term effects from contaminating very large areas of land. There are no regulations for evacuation in the event of a pool fire. 5. QUESTIONS ANDIOR COMMENTS FROM CITIZENS Citizens were asked to write their questions on cards, which were submitted to the Commissioners and read by Commissioner Brown. Has the NRC ever granted an open evidentiary hearing on a similar case? Is this case somewhat unique in this respect? Dr. Thompson was not certain on whether an evidentiary hearing has ever been held on the pool fire issue. However, the issue has been raised several times. His direct experience is that he has been involved in attempts to raise the issue of pool fires. He said that this is the first time, over the period of 20 years, that he has gotten anywhere close to discussing this issue in a regulatory forum. He thinks that Orange County has a case that is far more solid and well grounded than any previous case. There were several questions about the vulnerability of the Harris plant from natural disasters, particularly any kind of explosion or terrorist attack, extreme weather conditions, etc. Dr. Thompson said that the vulnerability to sabotage and terrorism is very real. After a lot of protests, the NRC required its reactor licensees to have vehicle barriers in place to keep suspect vehicles at a greater distance. There are extensive security provisions on the site. He said that there were numerous cases where an inside person could cause a reactor accident, acting alone. Regarding natural disasters, the Harris plant is pretty well protected against tornadoes and hurricanes because of the heavy concrete construction. Off-site power would be the most vulnerable feature of the plant. Do you think that there will be a national repository for nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain or anywhere in the United States anytime soon? Dr. Thompson said that the federal government has accepted responsibility far tang-term storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The utility companies have been paying the federal government to provide this service. The government has failed to meet its deadline for doing so, and there have been lawsuits that have obliged the government to pay back this money. The government is proceeding with one possible repository site, Yucca Mountain in Nevada. The licensing of this will require that the federal government, in the form of The Department of Energy, to apply to itself in the farm of the NRC for a license to construct and operate the repository inside this mountain. In addition, there is a plan to develop an interim storage facility nearby. This would be a monitored retrievable storage facility, which would use dry storage technology and fuel would be transported from around the country to this facility and placed underground in the mountain. The technology for having surface storage at Yucca Mountain exists today. Whether or not it will be implemented is purely a political question and not a technical one. Congress has, for several years in succession, voted in favor of shipping fuel to this surface facility and it has been vetoed by the President. He said that it was fairly clear under the Bush administration that there would be no such veto and a surface storage facility would exist in Nevada, perhaps beginning to operate within 5-10 years. The underground repository has some technical issues. By law, there has to be a licensing process and the public in Nevada can intervene. Can you comment on the legal requirements for CP&L to ensure itself against a potential accident with the spent fuel or any other potential large release? Dr. Thompson passed an this question. There were several questions about Dr. Thompson's original comments on the probability of an accident. Dr. Thompson said that the minimum probability number that he came up with, 1.6 by 10 to the -5, is based on previously conducted studies by the NRC staff and by CP&L. This number is 1.6 in 100,000 reactor years, which over a 30-year period is a one in 2000 probability of a pool fire. With 100 plants around the country, that is a one in 20 chance of a pool fire over a 30-year period. (Someone from the audience asked a question, but it did not pick upon the tape.) Dr. Thompson said that a decision on what matters and what does not is not a technical question. He said that his job was not to decide whether it matters ar nat. He said that he extrapolated the numbers nationwide because pool fires in other states could affect North Carolina significantly. Of the 100 plants in the United States over the last 20 years, how many have been involved in accidents? Dr. Thompson said that the United States has accumulated approximately 2000 reactor years in the history of commercial nuclear power. In that time, there has been one care melt accident in 1979. Worldwide, there have been 7,000 reactor years and there have been two core melt accidents, one in 1979 and one in 1986. There has never been a pool fire. How long must spent fuel stay in pools before it can be transferred to dry cask? Dr. Thompson did not recall the licensing requirement, but he believes it is five years or less. This means that there would be ample space in the Harris pools to store fuel at low density while it cools down. In your risk assessment, does it include earthquake, terrorism, weather conditions, and loss of water in the cooling plant? Dr. Thompson said that the licensing board would not listen to any discussion about sabotage or terrorism. The probability number does account for earthquakes and severe weather. Just this year, two nuclear plants in the United States lost cooling pools for two days undetected. Isn't there a law at the industry that says that this cannot happen? Dr. Thompson said that the regulatory structure that was built up under the Atomic Energy Act was predicated on the assumption that severe accidents would not occur. The industry objected every time actions were taken to account for the possibility that severe accidents would occur. The industry has come to the state where it does have some recognition of the possibility of severe accidents. He said that there were frequent events called precursor events where some equipment is unavailable or an error is made that, if continued for a longer interval or followed by another event could cause a severe accident. A few weeks ago a waste pool in Iowa lost its cooling pump. Why wasn't there serious radiation released then, and does an incident like this around the country occur, and what does it mean for storage of the same type at Shearon Harris? Dr. Thompson said that this event would be a precursor event. Could you speak to the difference that the NRC has in regulating power plants opposed to regulating the pools? Dr. Thompson said that in the past four decades, the NRC was very reluctant to admit the passibility of reactor accidents. Finally, they were forced to do so, and the occurrence of such an accident got their attention. The staff is denying and resisting again the probability of pool accidents. History shows that it is only through relentless efforts by citizens that these issues receive any attention. Could you speak to dry storage in terms of its relative safety to storing in pools, the long-term implications, and the cast? Dr. Thompson said that dry storage, if properly conducted (according to current regulations), will not cause a fire in the fuel under any scenario other than a direct attack on a cask or a volt. This direct attack could be by an individual or through some military means. An unfortunate feature of dry storage technology is that it is licensed only fora 20-year period. It is passible that dry storage would be needed far 100 years or more. Commissioner Brown then asked anyone from the audience to come and ask further questions. Pete McDowell from Orange County said that when Mr. Lochbaum was here, he answered a question about the susceptibility of the pool storage building to hurricanes and tornadoes by saying that it had not really been studied and that there were some questions. He asked for Dr. Thompson's comment on this. Dr. Thompson said that he had not made any personal study of the vulnerability of Harris structures to earthquake, hurricane, or tornado. From his tour of the plant he can say that it is quite a strongly built structure. He said that the building did have to meet certain design specifications. He said that it was not passible for any individual to answer every question about a big facility like this. Wells Ettleman, staff scientist with North Carolina Citizen's Research Group in Durham, said that the licensing board asked Orange County and its experts to comment on the report of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards that came out this spring. The report looked like a laundry list of things that could go wrong that the NRC staff had never looked at or ignored. He asked Dr. Thompson to comment on some of the problems that the ACRS raised, particularly the passibility of a thermal runaway reaction at a much lower temperature than is necessary to cause a fire directly. Also, he would like to hear Dr. Thompson's comment about the fuel and its ability to disintegrate and release a lot of the material inside it. Dr. Thompson said that when the intervention process was started in February 1999, CP&L and the staff were saying that pool fires would not occur. They have now changed their mind and have said that a fire would occur with a loss of water. The ACRS did play a role in changing the opinion of the staff in the industry. The other issues could be significant in terms of the amount of radioactivity that is released in a fire. The ACRS atone time speculated that high burner fuel would be pyrophoric, which means that, if exposed to air, it would ignite naturally even at low temperatures. He said that this probably would not occur. Wells Ettleman said that he was prepared to believe that the industry would oppose anything that they think is damaging to their interest. He asked for Dr. Thampson's comments on the NRC. He asked if they did not understand the risks or if they were corrupt and in the pockets of the industry. Dr. Thompson said that he has wondered about the same questions for many years. He sees no evidence of corruption within the NRC. There is some strong pressure from the Congress. He said that there was a lot of interchange of staff from the industry and the NRC. There are people in the NRC who believe that public resources can be wasted by giving overly much attention to safety issues where probability is low. The agency has a very low level of curiosity. 6. CLOSING REMARKS Commissioner Gordon thanked Dr. Gordan Thompson for sharing his expertise and for all of his work far Orange County. She thanked the citizens who came to the public forum and those in the viewing audience that have shown support. She also thanked the elected officials in the audience from neighboring jurisdictions that have shown support -Durham County Commissioner Joe Bowser, Chapel Hill Tawn Council Member Bill Strom, and State Senator Ellie Kinnaird. She said that Orange County believes that there are serious safety questions that should be addressed to the public, with all of the evidence publicly debated. The only way these safety questions can be answered is to pursue this legal process called intervention. This has been done for almost two years. The Orange County Commissioners want the public to knave that they are concerned about the public safety of Orange County citizens and all of the citizens in North Carolina. 7. ADJOURNMENT Chair Halkiotis thanked the Towns of Chapel Hill and Carrbaro and the County of Durham far joining hands with the County of Orange to show a clear commitment to the health, safety, and welfare of our citizens and our land. He adjourned the meeting. The next meeting on the regular meeting calendar will be held on December 9 at the Southern Human Services Center in Chapel Hill, North Carolina beginning at 9:04 a.m. Stephen H. Halkiotis, Chair Beverly Blythe, CMC