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HomeMy WebLinkAboutAgenda - 02-02-1999 - 9e1ORANGE COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ACTION AGENDA ITEM ABSTRACT Meeting Date: February 2, 1999 Action Agenda Item # SUBJECT: Additional Funding for Process to Determine Whether to Challenge the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff s proposed fording of "No Significant Additional Hazard" for Storage of Waste Nuclear Fuel Rods at Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant DEPARTMENT: County Manager ATTACHMENT(S): PUBLIC HEARING: Yes x No BUDGET AMENDMENT: Yes x No INFORMATION CONTACT: County Engineer Extension 2303 TELEPHONE NUMBERS: Hillsborough - 732-8181 Durham - 688-7331 Mebane - 227-2031 Chapel Hill - 967-9251/968-4501 PURPOSE: To present for BOCC review and discussion a proposition that the Board authorize the expenditure of an additional $1500 in legal fees to determine whether to challenge the NRC staff's proposed finding of "No Significant Additional Hazard" for CP&L's proposal to expand its high level nuclear waste storage operation for used nuclear fuel rods at the Shearon Harris nuclear power plant. BACKGROUND: CP&L has submitted an application, with accompanying technical documentation, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as necessary to obtain a modification to the Shearon Harris plant's existing operating permit allowing it to expand its storage capacity for spent nuclear fuels rods by: a) completing construction of two existing but incomplete temporary storage pools for spend fuel rods; and b) re-racking the spent fuels rods into a more densely packed configuration. NRC staff has completed a preliminary review of the documentation submitted and has proposed to make a finding that the CP&L proposal entails "No Significant Additional Hazard" to the level of hazard inherent in CP&L currently permitted operations. Orange County is currently involved in a process to evaluate: 1) CP&L's proposals for expanding its spent fuel rod storage capacity; and 2) the need for the County to formally intervene in the NRC's permitting process. The County has engaged the services of technical and legal consultants to evaluate the CP&L proposals and to prepare documentation for a possible formal intervention in the NRC permitting process. The County's legal consultant, Diane Curran, has advised County staff that the NRC permitting process may allow CP&L to proceed with its proposed expansion and re-racking activities and construction during a public hearing process generated by a successful intervention. If the County did decide to intervene and did intervene successfully, it would also have to challenge the proposed finding of "No Significant Additional Hazard" to ensure that CP&L not be allowed to initiate re-racking and pool construction activities during the public hearing process. In the event that the work being done by Gordon Thompson does provide the technical basis for intervening in the permitting process, his work will also provide the technical basis for challenging the finding of "No Significant Additional Hazard". However, there would be approximately $1500 in additional legal costs involved in filing and coordinating the documentation for the challenge. The BOCC's currently approved level of funding for technical and legal consulting work does not include any funds to challenge the proposed finding of "No Significant Additional Hazard". All of the work, both technical and legal, for the intervention and the challenge can be accomplished simultaneously. The information for the intervention and the challenge would be ready for review by the BOCC atd its February 9, 1999 deliberation on either proceeding with or terminating the intervention effort. RECOMMENDATION: As the Board decides. Should the Board decide to proceed with the legal work necessary to file a challenge to the proposed fmding of "no significant additional hazard", the Manager recommends that the funding again be provided through the Commissioners' Contingency account. NOTE: The Town of Chapel Hill has determined that it will provide $5000 in funding toward the costs of evaluating and developing the technical and legal basis for intervening in the Shearon Harris permitting process. Durham County has also determined that it will provide $5000 in funding to the process, subject to the positive recommendation of its Environmental Affairs Board. ORANGE COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ACTION AGENDA ITEM ABSTRACT Meeting Date: D~aC~~ 4~t Action Agenda Item # SUBJECT: Funding for process to obtain standing with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the permitting process for expanded storage of waste nuclear fuel rods at Shearon Harris nuclear power plant DEPARTMENT: County Manager PUBLIC HEARING: Yes No ATTACHMENT(S): County Engineer's memo WAIS Document Retrieval from Federal Register for 1/13/99 BUDGET AMENDMENT: Yes No INFORMATION CONTACT: County Engineer Extension 2303 TELEPHONE NUMBERS: Hillsborough - 732-8181 Durham - 688-7331 Mebane - 227-2031 Chapel Hill - 967-9251/968-4501 PURPOSE: To present for BOCC review a report on: 1) the process required to obtain the standing required to intervene in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) proceedings for. the review and approval of Carolina Power and Light's (CP&L) application to amend its operating permit to allow it to expand its high level nuclear waste storage operation for used nuclear fuel rods at its Shearon Harris nuclear power plant; and 2) the cost of funding the legal and engineering/technical consulting services necessary to review the CP& L waste storage expansion proposal and permit application and create and file the documents with the NRC as necessary to obtain standing. BACKGROUND: CP&L's has proposed to use its existing operational and partially constructed temporary waste storage pools at its Shearon Harris facility to store spent nuclear fuel rods from the Harris facility as well as it own Brunswick and Robinson nuclear power plants. To carry out this strategy, two existing but incomplete pools at the plant must be completed. This, in turn, requires that CP&L submit an application to modify the Harris operating permit to the NRC. In accordance with standard NRC procedures, the permit modification application has been submitted; NRC staff have proposed to make a fording that CP&L's expansion plans represent no significant h~.~.ard; and the NRC has published the notice of the application and the proposed staff finding - as of January 13, 1999 - in the Federal Register. The public, again in accordance with standard NRC DaQff~ procedures, is accorded a thirty day period in which to make comments to the NRC relative to the NRC staff finding, permit application and approval. For the Harris application, the comment deadline is February 12, 1999. The NRC's process for providing comment relative to permit and permit modification applications is complex and appears to be designed to inhibit or preclude public participation in its review and approval process. The public input process requires that any concerned party submit comments or contentions to the NRC as to perceived inadequacies in the NRC staff finding, permit application or activity being permitted. The NRC staff reviews both the contentions and the credentials or particulazs of the party making the contentions. If the staff deems that the contentions may have validity and that the party making the contentions has a legitimate or valid claim to being affected by the permitted activity, that party is deemed to have the "standing" necessary to participate or intervene in the application comment and review process. The fact that a party is deemed to have standing and has submitted valid or potentially valid contentions does not necessarily mean that the permit applicant will have to abandon or modify its plan. The NRC may ultimately require that the applicant submit additional information or it may deem that the contentions aze, in the final analysis, invalid. The NRC can and does issue permits over the objections of all parties deemed to have standing. Those parties may then appeal the NRC decision in the federal judicial system. It does appear, however, that any parry having concerns about or objections to the activity being permitted must get or have attempted to acquire standing before the NRC to preserve or establish its right to appeal NRC decisions. If Orange County wishes to intervene in the permitting process by establishing standing before the NRC or preserve its right to a judicial appeal of an NRC decision regazding the CP&L permit application, it must act immediately. The County must fund and acquire the technical and legal assistance to evaluate CP&L's proposal and permit application and to file the documents necessary to make contentions and establish standing with the NRC. The estimated cost of these consulting and legal services ranges between $12,000 and $18,000. While it may ultimately be possible to convince other concerned local jurisdictions to fund a portion of these costs, the comment period time frame is too short to allow for the necessary intergovernmental consultations and legislative action and still complete the consulting work. RECOMMENDATION: As the Board decides. MEMORANDUM . TO: County Commissioners John Link, County Manager FROM: Paul Thames, PE, County Engine DATE: January 15, 1999 SUBJECT: Process for obtaining standing with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the proceedings for the permitting of expanded storage of waste nuclear fuel rods at Shearon Harris nuclear power plant The federal government's failure to provide permanent storage facilities for the high level radioactive waste, in the form of spent fuel rods, produced by this county's nuclear power plants has caused a number of problems for the nuclear power industry. The industry has faced a particularly serious problem in finding or developing "temporary" storage facilities for spent fuels rods. Such storage is designated as temporary because, although the period of storage may be measured in years or decades, the federal government still responsible for providing permanent storage for this material. The answer for many power companies has been to utilize waste storage technologies designed and developed for short term storage as stopgap measures for a much longer term, though not permanent, waste storage problem. CP&L's Shearon Harris nuclear power plant, located in Chatham County, has been storing its waste on site for a number of years in its existing temporary storage pools. These facilities were designed to store the materials for the relatively short period of time between removal of the material from the reactor core and its shipment to permanent storage. The Shearon Harris temporary storage pool facilities have also been used to store the spent fuel rods from CP&L's nuclear plants at Brunswick, NC, and Robinson, SC. Consequently, the storage capacity of the existing facilities at Shearon Harris has been nearly exhausted. CP&L has now proposed to expand the capacity of Shearon Harris facilities to accommodate additional waste storage by completing the construction of two temporary storage pools begun nearly twenty years ago but left uncompleted when the overall capacity of the generating facility -and projected need for temporary storage -was reduced. CP&L has submitted an application to amend its operating permit (to allow the expansion of its temporary storage facilities) to the NRC. NRC staff have reviewed the application and propose to make a finding that the CP&L expansion plan represents no significant increase in hazard over that of currently permitted and approved operational practices. In accordance with standard NRC procedures, the notice of the application and the proposed staff fmding of no significant hazard has been published - as of January 13, 1999 - in the Federal Register. The public, again in accordance with standard NRC procedures, is according a thirty day period in which to make comments to the NRC relative to the proposed NRC staff finding of no significant increase in hazard and the permit application and approval. The deadline for public comment is February 12, 1999. Various local individuals, organizations and governments, including Orange County, have expressed reservations about these existing and proposed nuclear waste storage practices and plans. Furthermore,. these same individuals and entities have expressed concern about the lack of and process for the providing of public input into the regulatory approval procedures. Some individuals and organizations have advocated opening a dialogue with CP&L to create the opportunity to have technical concerns addressed and to provide public scrutiny into the planning, permitting and operational process. CP&L's participation in any such dialogue is strictly voluntary. It is required only to conform to NRC standards, policies and procedures. In the event that the process of voluntary dialogue fails, only the federal regulatory and judicial processes are available to address unresolved issues. The NRC's process for providing comment relative to permit and permit modification applications is complex and appears to be designed to discourage, inhibit or preclude public participation in its review and approval process. The comment process requires that a concerned party submit comments or contentions to the NRC relative to inadequacies in NRC staff findings, the permit application or problems with the activity or action being permitted. The NRC staff reviews both the contentions and the credentials or particulars of the party making the contentions. If the staff deems that the contentions may have potential validity and that the party making the contentions has a legitimate or valid claim to being affected by the permitted activity, the party is deemed to have the "standing" necessary to participate in the permitting comment and review process. The fact that a party is deemed to have standing or have submitted valid or potentially valid contentions does not mean that the permit applicant will be forced to abandon or modify its plan. The NRC may ultimately require that the applicant submit additional information or it may deem that the contentions have been addressed adequately. The NRC may issue the permit over the objections of any and all parties deemed to have standing. Those parties may then appeal the NRC decision in the federal judicial system. It does appear, however, that any party having concerns about or objections to the activity being permitted must get or have attempted to get standing before the NRC to preserve or establish its right to appeal NRC decisions. If Orange County wishes to intervene in the permitting process by establishing standing before the NRC or by judicial appeal of an NRC decision relative to the CP&L permit application, it must act immediately to fund and acquire technical and legal assistance. The technical and legal consultants will evaluate the NRC staff finding, the CP&L proposal and the permit application materials. They will work together to develop and evaluate contentions to be submitted to the NRC and will handle the process to establish standing for Orange County. The cost of this consultation and activity is estimated to be between $12,000 and $18,000. It may be possible to convince other concerned local jurisdictions to ultimately fund some of these costs. However, the comment period time frame is so short and the consultants' work so time consuming as to preclude efforts to coordinate the legislative actions required to obtain such funding commitments prior to beginning the work. Other than the obvious financial issues, there are additional potential implications to an Orange County action to intervene in the permitting process. CP&L may be alienated or threatened by County intervention activity to the point that it withdraws from any voluntary public discussion and input activities. Conversely, the intervention may provide leverage necessary to convince CP&L to participate in a voluntary discussion and public input process. At this time, no one -including County staff -has knowledge or information sufficient to predict a CP&L reaction to a County or local government attempt to become formally involved in the actual NRC permit approval process. If I may provide additional information, please advise. Health and Economic Consequences of Accidents from High-Level Nuclear Waste Storage The following is a summary of key points from a 1997 study performed for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission by the Brookhaven National Laboratories (BNL). The BNL study describes various types of serious accidents that can occur in High-Level nuclear waste storage pools. _ - The largest accidents considered in the BNL study could kill approximately 100 people immediately, cause 140,000 cancer deaths, contaminate over 1.5 million acres of farmland so badly that it could never be decontaminated, and cause over 500 billion in .property damage not including costs of health damage. - Even a much smaller accident involving leaks from only 700 to 1,700 fuel assemblies could cause nearly 20,000 cancer deaths, cause $25 billion in property damage off-site from the plant while permanently contaminating up to 16,000•acres of farmland. CP&L proposes a total of over 8,000 fuel assemblies at Shearon Harris. - Of the 8 most severe accidents studied by BNL, 4 would exceed $50 billion in off-site property damage, 3 would exceed $100 billion, and 2 would exceed $200 billion with a maximum of $566 billion of off-site property damages. , - Four of these accidents could force the abandonment of 100,000 acres of farmland or. more, with a maximum of 1.7 million acres that would be too radioactive to ever clean up; 4 accidents would also exceed 25,000 cancer deaths, 3 of which could exceed 50,000 deaths. - By comparison, a severe meltdown of a nuclear unit considerably larger that Shearon Harris would be expected to cause 88. to 160 quick deaths,'35,000 to 110,000 cancer deaths and the loss of 1.3 million acres of farmland, according to a 1995 study also conducted by Brookhaven National Laboratory. While that study did not estimate economic damages from a meltdown, the largest numbers we know of range from $200 billion to over $300 billion - or about half as much as the most serious spent.fuel accident that BNL reported in the 1997 study. - Over the 27 years CP&L proposes to operate the expanded waste pools, the probability of the most severe accident according to BNL would be about 1 in 18,000, which is 12 times higher than previous NRC estimates for a severe spent fuel accident. Chernobyl had an estimated 1 in 10,000 chance of an accident by comparison. - BNL estimates the probability of an accident causing nearly 20,000 cancer deaths and $25 billion in property damage has a cumulative probability of about 1 in 125. - independent scientists believe BNL may have underestimated the probabilities of accidents. - The BNL study did not consider worst case accidents. CP&L's plans would have more than 3 times as much waste fuel in storage as considered by BNL. , : Jan 1999 Waste Awareness andAeductionNeiwork 919-490-0747 Fax 493-6614 NC-WARNC~POBOX.COM NC WARN )~ FO Box 61051, Durham, NC 27715-1051 i 1 February 15, 1999 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE NRC STAFF In the Matter of ) CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT ) Docket No. 50-400 (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant) ) DECLARATION OF DR. GORDON THOMPSON I, Gordon Thompson, declare as follows: A. Introduction 1. I am the executive director of the Institute for Resource and Security Studies (IRSS), a nonprofit, tax-exempt corporation based in Massachusetts. Our office is located at 27 Ellsworth Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02139. IRSS was founded in 1984 to conduct technical and policy analysis and public education, with the objective of promoting peace and international security, efficient use of natural resources, and protection of the environment. 2. This Declaration pertains to an application by Carolina Power and Light (CP&L) for an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-63, which covers the Shearon Hams nuclear power plant. The staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has reviewed CP&L's application and proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. The NRC has sought public comments on the proposed determination.l Through this Declaration, I offer comments on the NRC staff s proposed determination. I have prepared these comments pursuant to an agreement by IRSS to provide technical information and other. services to Orange County, North Carolina. B. My Professional Background 3. I received an undergraduate education in science and mechanical engineering at the University of New South Wales, in Australia. Subsequently, I pursued graduate studies at Oxford University and received from that institution a Doctorate of Philosophy in mathematics in 1973, for analyses of plasmas undergoing thermonuclear fusion. During my graduate studies I was associated with the fusion research program of the UK Atomic Energy Authority. 4. During my professional career, I have performed technical and policy analyses on a range of issues related to international security, energy supply, environmental protection, and sustainable use of natural resources. Since 1977, a significant part of my work has consisted of technical analyses of safety and environmental issues related to nuclear facilities. These analyses have been sponsored by a variety of nongovernmental organizations and local, state and national governments, 1 Federal Register: January 13, 1999 (Volume 64, Number 8), pages 2237-2241. 2 predominantly in North America and western Europe. Drawing upon these analyses, I have provided expert testimony in legal and regulatory proceedings, and have served on committees advising US government agencies. My CV is provided here as Attachment A. C. Scope of My Review 5. In prepazation of this Declaration, I reviewed the NRC's Federal Register notice for the proposed license amendment, the Final Safety Analysis Report for the Sheazon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, the Final Environmental Statement related to the operation of Shearon Harris Nucleaz Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 (NUREG-0972, October 1983), and CP&L's application for the proposed license amendment. I also reviewed various correspondence and technical documents relating to the propose license amendment and to risks of spent fuel storage, which aze identified below. 6. The information that has been provided by the NRC and CP&L to date does not contain all of the detail that I would need to provide a complete, final statement about the hazards associated with the proposed license amendment. I would expect to review the full body of detailed evidence and present my final evaluation in the context of a hearing. However, even the limited information provided so far is adequate to permit me to identify serious safety concerns which preclude the NRC from making a "no significant hazards" determination. These issues should be addressed through the systematic, public process that a prior licensing hearing can provide. D. The "No Significant Hazards" Standard 7. The NRC has stated its standard for determining that a license amendment request involves no significant hazazds consideration.2 The standard is met if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. 8. In my professional opinion, based on the preliminary evidence provided by the NRC and CP&L, operation of the Shearon Harris plant in accordance with the license amendment proposed by CP&L will violate all three of the conditions set forth in the preceding paragraph. Therefore, the NRC staff should reverse its position and should determine that CP&L's license amendment request does not involve no significant hazards consideration. E. The License Amendment in Context -Spent Fuel Management at Harris 9. Before discussing my concerns about the safety implications of the proposed license amendment, I provide here some background information about spent fuel management at the Harris plant and CP&L's proposal to increase the spent fuel storage capacity at Harris. Unless specified otherwise, the information presented here is drawn from CP&L's license amendment application or from CP&L's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the Harris plant. 2 Ibid. 3 10. The Harris plant features one pressurized-water reactor (PWR). The core of this reactor contains 157 fuel assemblies, with acenter-center distance of about 8.5 inches. The Harris plant was to have four reactors but only one was built. A fuel handling building was built to serve all four reactors. This building contains four fuel pools (A, B, C, D), a cask loading pool and three fuel transfer canals, all interconnected but separable by gates. Pools A and B contain fuel racks. Pools C and D are flooded but do not contain racks. The cooling and water cleanup systems for pools C and D were never completed. 11. Pool A now contains six PWR racks (360 fuel assembly spaces) and three BWR racks (363 spaces), for a total pool capacity of 723 fuel assemblies. Pool B contains twelve PWR racks (768 spaces) and seventeen BWR racks (2,057 spaces), and is licensed to store one additional BWR rack (121 spaces), for a total pool capacity of 2,946 fuel assemblies. Thus, pools A and B now have a combined capacity of 3,669 fuel assemblies. The center-center distance in pools A and B is 10.5 inches for PWR fuel and 6.25 inches for BWR fuel. 12. Pools A and B store spent fuel from the Harris reactor and from CP&L's Brunswick plant and Robinson plant. The Brunswick plant has two boiling-water reactors (BWRs) while the Robinson plant has one PWR. Shipment of spent fuel from Brunswick and Robinson to Harris is said by CP&L to be necessary to allow core offload capacity in the pools at Brunswick and Robinson. 13. CP&L seeks an amendment to its operating license so that it can activate pools C and D at Harris. By activating these pools, CP&L expects to have sufficient spent fuel storage capacity for all four CP&L reactors (Harris, Robinson and the two Brunswick reactors) through the end of their current operating licenses. 14. CP&L plans to install racks in pool C in three campaigns (approximately in 2000, 2005 and 2014), to create 927 PWR spaces and 2,763 BWR spaces, for a total pool capacity of 3,690 fuel assemblies. Thereafter, CP&L plans to install racks in pool D in two campaigns (approximately in 2016 and at a date to be determined), to create. 1,025 PWR spaces. Thus, the ultimate capacity of pools C and D will be 4,715 fuel assemblies. The center-center distance will be 9.0 inches for PWR fuel and 6.25 inches for BWR fuel. 15. The PWR racks in pools C and D have a smaller center-center distance than the racks in pools A and B (9.0 inches instead of 10.5 inches). This arrangement allows more PWR fuel to be placed in a given pool area but also means that PWR fuel in pools C and D is more prone to undergo criticality. In response, CP&L proposes to include in the Technical Specifications for Harris a provision that PWR fuel will not be placed in pools C and D unless it has relatively-low enrichment and high burnup.3 F. Some Technical Safety Issues Raised By the Proposed License Amendment 16. CP&L's plan for the activation of pools C and D raises a variety of technical safety issues. This. section of my Declaration describes some of those issues. Later parts of the Declaration relate these issues to the NRC's standard fora "no significant hazards" determination. s License amendment application, Enclosure 5 4 17. NRC regulations require that spent fuel storage pools must be cooled by safety grade cooling systems. When the Harris plant was designed, the intention was that pools C and D would be cooled by the component cooling water (CCW) system for the second unit of the Harris plant a That unit was never built, and therefore the Unit 2 CCW system does not exist. In the absence of a second CCW system, CP&L plans to cool pools C and D by connecting their cooling systems to the CCW system of the first unit. This system already provides cooling to pools A and B and serves other, important safety functions. Attachment B provides supporting information.5 It should be noted that CP&L considered, but has not pursued, the option of cooling pools C and D by a new, independent system that could have had dedicated emergency diesel generators. Attachment C provides information in support of this point.6 Three significant safety issues are raised by the fact that the spent fuel pool cooling arrangement originally designed for pools C and D of the Harris plant was not completed. These issues relate to the heat loading of the existing CCW system, the load on the existing emergency diesel generators, and the loss of some important quality assurance documentation for cooling piping at pools C and D. 18. Heat load. According to CP&L's license amendment application, the bounding heat load from. the fuel in pools C and D will be 15.6 million BTU/hour:~ At present, the CCW system cannot absorb this additional heat load. Thus, CP&L proposes to include in the Technical Specifications for Harris an interim provision that the heat load in pools C and D will not be allowed to exceed 1.0 million BTU/hour.8 CP&L claims that an additional heat load of 1.0 million BTU/hour can be accommodated by the existing CCW system, and that the fuel to be placed in pools C and D will not create a heat load exceeding 1.0 million BTU/hour through 2001. 19. Apparently, CP&L contemplates a future upgrade of the CCW system, so that the CCW system can accommodate an additional heat load of 15:6 million BTU/hour from pools C and D. This contemplated upgrade is not described in the present license amendment application. Attachment C indicates that CP&L plans to perform the upgrade of the CCW system concurrent with a power uprate for the Hams reactor. Apparently, a 4.5 percent power uprate will be associated with steam generator replacement, and there will be a subsequent further power uprate of 1.5 percent. A chart in Attachment C shows that the projected CCW heat load, including the reactor power uprate and the use of pools. C and D, will substantially exceed the capability of the present CCW system. 20. To summarize, CP&L's short-term plan (through 2001) for cooling pools C and D is to exploit the margin in the existing CCW system, so as to accommodate an additional heat load of 1.0 million BTU/hour. CP&L's longer-term plan is to upgrade the CCW 4 The Harris pools have their own closed-circuit cooling systems, which can transfer heat to the relevant CCW system through heat exchangers. 5 Attachment B is a portion of a set of viewgraphs (titled "Harris Spent Fuel Pool 'C' and 'D' Activation") shown by CP&L representatives during a meeting with NRC staff on 16 July 1998. ~ 6 Attachment C is an NRC staff memo about a meeting between CP&L representatives and NRC staff on 3 March 1998, together with a portion of a set of viewgraphs (titled "HNP Spent Fuel Pool'C' and'D' Activation") shown by CP&L during that meeting. ~ ~ License amendment application, Enclosure 7, page 5-16. s License amendment application, Enclosure 5. 5 system, in a manner not yet specified, so as to accommodate an additional heat load of 15.6 million BTU/hour. The CCW upgrade must also accommodate an increase in the rated power of the Harris reactor. Attachment B indicates CP&L's expectation that the design of the CCW upgrade will commence in mid-1999 and will be completed in early 2001, one year after pool C enters service. 21. In order to avoid exceeding the available margin in the existing CCW system while cooling pools C and D, CP&L may be obliged to require its operators to divert some CCW flow from the residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchangers during the recirculation phase of a design-basis loss-of-coolant accident (COCA) event at the Harris reactor.9 This raises a safety issue because, during the recirculation phase of a COCA, operation of the RHR system is essential to keeping the reactor core and containment in a safe condition. Both CP&L and the NRC have identified the proposed additional heat load on the Unit 1 CCW system as an "unreviewed safety question," i.e., a safety question that has not been previously reviewed by the NRC Staff.10 It should be noted in this context that exploitation of the margin in the existing CCW system may involve changes in design assumptions that include fouling factors and tube plugging limits. See Attachment C. The discussion of CCW capability which is provided in Enclosure 9 of CP&L's license amendment application is insufficient to determine the nature and significance of the assumptions made by CP&L. 22. Backup diesel generators. The cooling systems for pools C and D will draw electrical power from the electrical systems of the existing Harris plant. If electricity supply to the cooling pumps for pools C and D is interrupted, the pools will heat up and eventually boil. CP&L says that pools C and D will begin to boil after a time period "in excess of 13 hours", assuming a bounding decay heat load of 15.6 million BTU/hour.il To prevent the onset of pool boiling in the event of a loss of offsite power, the Harris operators may be obliged to provide electrical power to pools C and D from the emergency diesel generators, which also serve pools A and B and the reactor. In the present license amendment application, CP&L does not address the ability of the emergency diesel generators to meet the additional electrical loads associated with pools C and D. CP&L does mention in the Harris FSAR the potential for connecting "portable pumps" to bypass the pool cooling pumps should the latter be inoperable.12 However, the characteristics, capabilities and availability of such portable pumps are not addressed in the present license amendment application. Meeting the electrical load of pools C and D from the systems of the existing Harris plant is a safety issue because it could increase the probability of design-basis or severe accidents at the Harris reactor or at pools A through G. 23. Lack of QA documents. Activation of pools C and D will require the completion of their cooling and water cleanup systems, and the connection of their cooling systems to the existing CCW system. CP&L states that approximately 80% of the necessary piping was completed before the second Harris reactor was cancelled.13 However, some of the 9 License amendment application, Enclosure 9. to Ibid; Federal Register notice for this application. 11 License amendment application, Enclosure 7, page 5-8. 12 Harris FSAR, page 9.1.3-4, Amendment No. 48. 13 License amendment application, Enclosure 1, page 4. 6 quality assurance documentation for the completed piping is no longer available. Much of the completed piping is embedded in concrete and is therefore difficult or impossible to inspect. To address this situation, CP&L proposes an Alternative Plan to demonstrate that the previously completed piping and other equipment is adequate for its purpose.ia Nevertheless, the cooling systems for pools C and D will not satisfy ASME code requirements. Attachment D provides supporting information.15 Failure to satisfy ASME code requirements could increase the probability of design-basis or severe accidents at pools C and D. G. The Degree of Hazard Posed by Spent Fuel Storage at Harris 24. The NRC and CP&L have performed and published site-specific analyses which provide information about potential severe accidents at the Harris reactor. However, to my knowledge neither NRC nor CP&L has performed any site-specific analysis which examines potential severe accidents affecting any of the Harris fuel pools,. including pools C and D. 25. The NRC examined severe reactor accidents in its Final Environmental Statement for the Harris plant.16 Site-specific consequence modelling was performed by the NRC for hypothetical accidents that released as much as 82 percent of the inventory of cesium isotopes in the reactor core. CP&L has submitted to the NRC an Individual Plant Examination (IPE) for the Hams plant.~~ In addition, CP&L has submitted a similar analysis (an IPEEE) for "external" initiating events.lg The IPE and IPEEE studies examined the potential for severe reactor accidents that could release substantial amounts of radioactivity. 26. In the absence of similar studies for the Harris pools, one must perform scoping calculations to indicate the degree of hazard posed by spent fuel storage at Harris. The degree of hazard is important when one considers the relevance of a safety issue to a determination of "no significant hazards". If preliminary evidence about a safety issue suggests the potential for accidents with either high probability or large consequences, then the NRC staff should not make a determination of "no significant hazards". 27. The radioisotope cesium-137 is one important indicator of the hazard potential posed by a nuclear facility. This isotope has ahalf--life of 30 years, emits intense gamma radiation, and is released comparatively readily during severe accidents. The 1986 Chernobyl accident released about 90,000 TBq (27 kg) of cesium-137 to the atmosphere, which accounted for most of the offsite radiation exposure attributable to that accident. la License amendment application, Enclosure 8 15 Attachment D is a portion of a set of viewgraphs (titled "1OCFRSO.SSa Alternative Plan") shown by CP&L representatives during a meeting with NRC staff on 16 July 1998. 16 NRC, Final Environmental Statement related to the operation of Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, NUREG-0972, October 1983. 17 CP&L, Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Individual Plant Examination Submittal, Final Report, 31 August 1993. 18 CP&L, Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Unit No. 1, Individual Plant Examination for External Events Submittal, June 1995. Official estimates indicate that this exposure will cause 50-100 thousand extra cancer fatalities worldwide over the next 70 yeazs.19 28. The core of the Harris reactor contains 157 PWR fuel assemblies. At shutdown, this core contains about 155,000 TBq (47 kg) of cesium-137.20 When a spent fuel assembly is discharged from the reactor, it will contain more cesium-137 than the average assembly at shutdown. CP&L plans an eventual, aggregate capacity in the Harris pools of 3,080 PWR assemblies and 5,304 BWR assemblies. Note that the cesium-137 content in each BWR assembly will be about one. quarter the cesium-137 content in each PWR assembly, if both assemblies have been dischazged for an equal period.21 After dischazge, the content of cesium-137 in a fuel assembly will decay exponentially with ahalf--life of 30 years. 29. As a simplified illustration, assume that all fuel assemblies in the Harris pools have been discharged for an equal period. Further assume that all four pools are full and contain 3,080 PWR assemblies and 5,304 BWR assemblies. The pools will then contain as much cesium-137 as 4,406 PWR assemblies. (3,080 + 5,304 x 1/4 = 4,406) Note that 4,406 PWR assemblies represent 28 cores of the Harris reactor. 30. If an accident can be postulated that releases to the environment a significant fraction of the cesium-137 in the Harris pools, then it is clear that the consequences of this accident would be large. The offsite radiation exposure could be an order of magnitude larger-than the exposure from the Chernobyl accident. Activation of pools C and D could lead to an accident which creates offsite radiation exposure as much as two times higher than the exposure that would arise from a similar accident involving only pools A and B. H. Loss of Water from Spent Fuel Pools at Harris 31. Loss of water from one or more of the Harris pools could initiate a release to the environment of a significant fraction of the cesium-137 in the pools. This potential exists because the cladding of PWR or BWR fuel is a zirconium alloy which can react exothermically with air or steam. Thus, if the water in a fuel pool is removed and the fuel is partially or totally uncovered, one must be concerned about the possibility of a runawayair-zircomum or steam-zirconium reaction. Such a reaction could release cesium-137 and other radioisotopes from affected fuel-into the fuel building. That building was not designed to contain radioisotopes released during a vigorous exothermic reaction in the pools, and it can be assumed that most of the volatile radioisotopes entering the building from the affected fuel would be released from the building as an atmospheric plume. 32. Several reports prepared by or for the NRC have examined the conditions under which a runaway zirconium reaction might occur.22 However, these reports have ~9 Allan S Krass, Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Institute for ~ Resource and Security Studies, December 1991). 20 NRC, Final Environmental Statement, page 5-50. 21 The ratio of one quarter derives from the parameters shown in the license amendment application, ~ Enclosure 7, page 5-15. 22 Relevant reports include: V L Sailor et al, Severe Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools in Support of Generic Safety Issue 82, NUREG/CR-4982, July 1987; E D Throm, Regulatory Analysis for the Resolution of Generic Issue 82, "Beyond Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools", NUREG-1353, April 1989; and R 8 concentrated almost entirely on a postulated condition of instantaneous, complete loss of water from a pool. Such a condition is unrealistic in any scenario which preserves the configuration of the spent fuel racks. If water is lost by drainage or evaporation and no makeup occurs, then complete loss of water will always be preceded by partial uncovering of the fuel. If makeup is considered, the water level could fall, rise or remain static for long periods. 33. Partial uncovering of the fuel will often. be a more severe condition than complete loss of water because, during partial uncovering, convective heat loss is suppressed by the residual water at the base of the fuel assemblies. As a result, longer-discharged fuel with a lower heat output may undergo a runaway steam-zirconium reaction during partial uncovering while it would not undergo a runaway air-zirconium reaction if the pool were instantaneously emptied. 34. I am aware of only one instance in which reports produced by or for the NRC address the hazard posed by partial uncovering, namely in a report prepared for the NRC by Sandia Laboratories and published in 1979.23 Part of this report did address a situation of partial uncovering, but used a crude heat transfer model and neglected to consider the onset of asteam-zirconium reaction. Nevertheless, the report found (page 76) that "......an incomplete drainage can potentially cause a more severe heatup problem than a complete drainage, if the residual water remains near-the baseplates". A portion of the 1979 Sandia report is provided here as Attachment E. An internal NRC memo mentions the consideration of partial uncovering in the 1979 Sandia report.24. Otherwise, it appears that the NRC has ignored the hazard posed by partial uncovering. This hazard was not reflected in the regulatory analysis whereby the NRC purportedly resolved Generic Issue 82.25 35. In a situation of falling water level, a fuel assembly might first undergo a runaway steam-zirconium reaction, then switch to anair-zirconium reaction as water falls below the base of the rack and convective air flow is established. In this manner, a runaway alr- zirconium reaction could occur in a fuel assembly that is too long-discharged (and therefore produces too little heat) to suffer such a reaction in the event of instantaneous, complete loss of water. Conversely, a rising water level could precipitate a runaway steam-zirconium reaction in a fuel assembly that had previously been completely uncovered but had not necessarily suffered a runaway air-zirconium reaction while in that condition. The latter point is highly significant in the context of emergency measures to recover control of a pool which has experienced water loss. Inappropriate addition of water to a pool could exacerbate the accident. 36. The NRC's failure to consider partial uncovering of fuel should be borne in mind when one reviews NRC-sponsored reports that purport to address the hazard posed by water loss from a fuel pool. This hazard should be re-analyzed through detailed J Travis et al, A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR and PWR Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG/CR-6451, August 1997. ~ 23 Allan S Benjamin et al, Spent Fuel Heatup Following Loss of Water During Storage, NUREG/CR-0649, March 1979. ~ 24 Internal NRC Memorandum from J T Han to M Silberberg, "Response to a NRR request to review SNL studies regarding spent fuel heatup and burning following loss of water in storage pool", 21 May 1984. ~ 25 E D Throm, op cit 9 modelling. The modelling should consider both partial and complete uncovering and the transition from one of these states to the other. Also, the modelling should cover: (1) thermal radiation, conduction, and steam or air convection; (2) air-zirconium and steam- zirconium reactions; (3) variations along the fuel rod axis; and (4) radial variations within a representative fuel rod, including effects of the pellet-cladding gap. Experiments will probably be required to support and validate the modelling. 37. Until the problem of water loss is re-analyzed in this manner, there is no basis for determining when fuel has been discharged for a sufficiently long period that it will not suffer a runaway zirconium reaction in the event of water loss. If the problem were to be properly analyzed through validated models, such a determination could be made within some margin of error, but the determination should consider site-specific factors. For example, the detailed design of a rack might be an important site-specific factor. 38. No determination of this kind has been made for pools C and D at Harris, nor does the methodology now exist to make such a determination. In any case, there is nothing in the license amendment application and its proposed modifications to the Harris Technical Specifications which prohibits the placing of freshly discharged fuel in pools C and D. Reports previously prepared for the NRC concede that freshly discharged fuel can experience a runaway air-zirconium reaction in the event of complete water loss. 39. A variety of events, alone or in combination, could lead to partial. or complete uncovering of spent fuel in the Harris pools. This class of events should be subjected to the kind of systematic analysis that is performed in an IPE and an IPEEE. Relevant events include: (1) an earthquake, cask drop, aircraft crash, human error, equipment failure or sabotage event that leads to direct leakage from the pools; (2) siphoning of water from the pools through accident or malice; (3) interruption of pool cooling, leading to pool boiling and loss of water by evaporation; and (4) loss of water from active pools into adjacent pools or canals that have been gated off and drained. Interactions with the Harris reactor should be considered. For example, a reactor accident might release radioactivity that precludes personnel access to the plant for purposes of maintaining or restoring pool cooling. I. Increased Probability or Consequences of Accidents Previously Evaluated 40. The Federal Register notice of this license amendment application claims that the probability of a spent fuel assembly drop or a misloaded fuel assembly is not significantly increased if the license amendment is approved and pools C and D are activated. This claim is false, because activation of pools C and D will roughly double the total number of fuel handling operations to be conducted at Harris. Assuming that the general nature of fuel handling operations continues as before, the probability of a fuel assembly dxop or misloaded fuel assembly, integrated over the entire period of the Harris operating license, will increase significantly, by a factor of two. This point has been made by David Lochbaum of the Union of Concerned Scientists, in a 22 January 19991etter to the NRC Commissioners. A.copy of his letter is provided here as Attachment F. If probability is integrated over the remaining period of the Harris operating license, rather than over its total duration, then activation of pools C and D will more than double the probability of a fuel assembly drop or a misloaded fuel assembly. 41. A spent fuel assembly drop or a misloaded fuel assembly are members of a broader class of accidents that could arise during the movement of fuel from other CP&L stations to Harris, and during fuel movement within Harris. This class of accidents will include design-basis accidents and severe accidents. Assuming that the general nature of fuel movement continues as before, the probability of accidents in this class, integrated over 10 the entire period of the Harris operating license, will double if pools C and D are activated. If integrated over .the remaining period of the operating license, the probability will more than double. 42. The PWR racks in pools C and D will be safe against criticality for a compazatively narrow range of fuel enrichment and burnup. Thus, assuming that the general nature of fuel-movement continues as before, the probability of a criticality accident will be significantly increased if pools C and D are activated. This probability will increase on a per-movement basis, so it will more than double when integrated over the entire period of the Harris operating license. The consequences of a criticality accident may also be significantly increased. 43. Activation of pools C and D will add to the electrical load and CCW heat load of existing Harris systems. It will also add to the burden of work on the Harris operators. These effects will increase the probability of two categories of design-basis or severe accidents. First, they will sigmficantly increase the probability of accidents associated with the Harris reactor, because the reactor's CCW and electrical systems and its operators will be under greater stress. Second, they will significantly increase the probability of accidents at the Harris pools that are attributable to interruptions in cooling and electricity supply and to increased operator stress. Also, the inability of cooling piping at pools C and D to meet ASME code requirements could significantly increase the probability of design-basis or severe accidents at these pools. 44. As mentioned in paragraph 24 above, to my knowledge there has been no site-specific analysis of severe accidents affecting any of the Harris pools. To the extent that such accidents have been previously evaluated, their consequences will be significantly increased by the activation of pools C and D. The fuel storage capacity of these pools will roughly double the storage capacity at Harris, creating the potential for a doubled inventory of radioactivity. Severe accidents could affect some or all of the Harris pools. As I have discussed in pazagraph 30 above, the potential doubling of radioactivity in the pools could significantly increase the consequences of severe accidents. J. Possibility of New or Different Kinds of Accident from any Accident Previously Evaluated 45. To my knowledge, there has been no site-specific evaluation of the probability or consequences of severe accidents at pools A and B at Harris. A variety of severe accidents are possible and should be subjected to the kind of systematic analysis that is performed in an IPE and IPEEE. The NRC has performed evaluations of accidents involving loss of water from fuel pools, generically and for sites other than Harris. However, these evaluations are seriously deficient because they failed to consider partial uncovering of fuel. To summarize, at pools A and B there exists the possibility of new or different kinds of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The same possibility will exist at pools C and D if these are activated. 46. Provision of electrical power and CCW service from the existing Harris plant to pools C and D could introduce the potential for design-basis or severe accidents that aze new or different from any accident previously considered. The IPE and IPEEE studies performed for Harris did not address the provision of electrical power and CCW service to pools C and D. As an example of the potential for new or different accidents, the need to provide cooling to pools C and D will place increased stress on the CCW system and the plant operators during adesign-basis LOCA. 11 47. Severe accidents at some or all of the Harris pools could lead to offsite radiation exposure an order of magnitude larger than the exposure from the Chernobyl accident. Activation of pools C and D could significantly increase both the probability and consequences of such accidents. Thus, CP&L's proposed license amendment poses a "significant hazazd" by any reasonable definition of that term. J. Significant Reductions in Margins of Safety. 48. Activation of pools C and D will create an additional heat load on the existing CCW system. CP&L proposes to meet this load in the short term by exploiting the margin in the CCW system. In my professional opinion, the reduction rn the CCW safety margin caused by the increased heat load is significant. Both the NRC and CP&L have also recognized that increasing the heat load on the CCW system constitutes an unreviewed safety question. The safety margin will be especially reduced if, during a LOCA, the operators must divert water from the RHR to the spent fuel pools. This will increase stress on the operators and create opportunities for human error. 49. As pools C and D become filled and the reactor receives a power uprate, the load on the CCW system will increase further. CP&L offers no assurance that the present margin of safety will be restored by upgrading the CCW system to accommodate these burdens. 50. CP&L proposes to activate pools C and D using cooling systems that will not satisfy ASME code requirements. This action could potentially cause a significant reduction in mazgins of safety for pool cooling. CP&L's Alternative Plan has not been subjected to any public scrutiny or rigorous review. It deserves, at the least, thorough consideration at a licensing hearing before the license amendment is issued. 51. CP&L proposes to provide electrical service to pools C and D from the existing (Unit 1) electrical system at Harris, having rejected the option of dedicated emergency diesel generators to serve pools C and D. The existing diesel generators already serve the safety systems in Unit. l and spent fuel storage pools A and B. By adding pools C and D to the load carried by the Unit 1 diesel generators, CP&L would add stress on the diesel generators and on the plant operators. In the event of a loss of offsite power, these effects could significantly reduce the margin of safety at the Harris reactor and the fuel pools. L. Environmental Review 52. As discussed above, the original design of the Shearon Hams plant called for cooling of spent fuel pools C and D by the Unit 2 CCW system. The FEIS for the operating license presumably based its conclusions on this design. I have seen no analysis by the NRC Staff, erther in the 1983 FEIS or in a subsequent Environmental Impact Statement or Environmental Assessment, of the environmental impacts of altering the Shearon Harris design to provide for cooling of pools C and D by the Unit 1 CCW system. M. Conclusions 53. From the preliminary evidence presented by the NRC and CP&L, I conclude that operation of the Shearon Harris plant in accordance with the license amendment proposed by CP&L will violate all three of the NRC's conditions for a determination of "no significant hazards." Therefore, the NRC staff should reverse its position and should determine that CP&L's license amendment request does not involve no significant hazards consideration. 12 54. The proposed license amendment raises serious safety concerns which deserve prior consideration at a licensing hearing. ************************ I declaze, under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing facts provided in my Declazation aze true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and that the opinions expressed herein aze based on my best professional judgment. Executed on 12 February 1999. Gordon Thompson HARMON~CURRAN,SPI ~ 19196443004-004 N0. 113 D02 ~-a- 99 i°~~` HAaMOIV, GETRRAIV, sic ~ FJS»a, L.L.P. 2001 S STREET, N.W. StJITB 430 WASHI1~iGTON, D.C. 20009-1125 ~rer.~o~e (202} 325-3;00 FAY (20?) 32$•6918 PRIVILEGED AND CON1P'IDENTIAL ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION AND ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT February i, 1999 Orange County Poard of Commissioners do Paul Thames, County Engineer 919ifi44-30004 SUBIECT: Legat Services Contract for Shearar Harris License Amendment Proceeding Dear Commissioners: I understand that the County has appropriated $b,000 to retain my services for legal representation in the first stages of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's license amendment proceeding for the proposed expansion of the Shearon Harris spent fi~ pool. In partieetlar, the Coutrty wishes to hire me for the purposes of a Request for Hearing/Fetition to Intervene and a set of cornentions. As further discussed below, I would also urge the County to consider challenging the NRC's "No Significant Hazards" finding. The purpose of this letter is to set forth proposed terms of my representation of the County in these matters. Proceda~t Baelcground of the Case Ln a Federal Register notice issued vn Ianuary 13, 1999, the NRC announced its intention to amend the Shearon Harris license to permit expansion of the spent fuel pool, aYUi offered the public an opportunity to reque~ a hearing by February 1 Z, 1999. The hearing offered in the Federal Register is guaranteed by the federal Atomic Energy Act to airy member of the public. that can show "standing, °' i.e., that he or she maybe adversely affected by the proposed action. In order to become a party to the case, it is necessary to file a Request for Hearing and Petition to Intervene. Ordinarily, the NRC must hold the hearing before the license is issued. However, a provision in the Atomic Energy Act allows the NRC to take the licensing action before the hearing is completed, if it finds the proposed action would pose "no significant hazard," in other words, if it is relatively innocuous. In this case, the NRC has made a preliminary determination that the Shearon I4arris spell fuel pool expansion would pose no significant hazards. The Federal 02i01~99 14:31 HARMON~CURRAN.SPI ~ 19196443004-004 N0.113 D03 ~N, CLAN, SPl~LBERG & EISEI~R'ERG, L.L.P. orange County Commissioners PIiIV1LEGED AND CONI4TDENTIAI. February 1, 1999 ATTORNEY-CLLENT CONIM'UNICATId)N Page 2 AND ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Register notice offers the public an opportunity to comment on whether this determination is reasonable, or whether instead the proposed action poses a significant danger, such that the hearing should be held before the license amendment is granted. These no significant hazards comments are also due February l2. If no such comments are made, or if the comments are rejected, Carolina Power & Light can go ahead and put the new racks into the spent fud pool before'the hearing is completed ar even started. This is a disadvantage to any members of the public who are seeking to litigate whether the proposed license amendment is reasonably safe, because it gives the proposed action momentuar that it otherwise would not have. Later on in the proceeding, probably inmid-March, any party that has requested a hearing will also be asked to submit "contentions," which set forth the issues that they wish to raise in the hearing. Those contentions that are admitted ittto the hearing will determine the scope of the issues that can be raised in the hearing. Descript~ Af L,egat Services As requested by the Board, I will prepare a Request for Hearing and Fetition to Irnervene on behalf of the County, to be filed on February 12. Working with Gordon Thompson, I will also prepare contentions challenging the safety of the proposed license amendment. I will also prepare any reply filings that are necessary and attend any prehearing conference scheduled by the NRC Incensing Board. My fee for this work is $150/hour plus expenses, including copying (tt~ 5.151page, long distance charges, postage, and travel costs- Although I will do most of the work on the case, I may receive assistance from my partners or associate attorneys, who charge $l50/hour and $100/hour, respectively. My estimate for completing the work is $6,t~0. Bills are sent out monthly, and payment is expected withip 30 days. In addition to the work described above,l would urge the Board to consider filing No Significant Hazards Comments. Although it is difficult to gain reversal of No Significam Hazards findings, I believe it is worthy of seriws consideration. The proposed amendment would make Shearon Harris the largest spent fuel storage facility on the East Coast. with a very large inventory of spent nuclear power plant foal. Consequently, an accident involving loss of coolant from the pool could have very severe consequences. Moreover, as discussed above, it is worthwhile to try to stop the the proposed expansion from gaining the momentum generated by pre-hearing implementation. I estimate that preparation ofNo Significant Hazards comments would take an additional ten hours of my time, costing $1,500. It would also require ih. Thompson to prepare an affidavit 14:31 HARMON~CURRAN~SPI -~ 19196443604-004 ~IbR11~ON, t~IRRAN, SP~.BERG & EISSIVBEII<G, L.L.P. N0.113 D04 Orange County Commissioners PRIVILEGED AND CONFD3ENTL4L February 1, 1499 ATTORNEY-CLIENT GOMMU1rlICATION Page 3 ANA ATTORNEY WORK F1EiODUCT setting forth the reasons that the prapased amendment poses a significant hazard to public health and safety. I recommend that you request Dr. Thompson to address the significance of the hazards posed by the proposed spent fuel pool expansion in the memorandum he is preparing for submission on February S, and ask him for an estimate for the cost of preparing an affidavit. If you wish to retain my services for the filing of a Request for Hearing/Petitian to Intervene and No Significant Hazards comments, please provide an authorized signature below. In addition, please send a retainer of $2,x00. If you do not wish me to prepare the No Significant Hazards camrnents, please cross out the last two Paragraphs on page 2. I hope that you will contact me soon about your wishes, as the time frames set by the Commission leave little time to prepare. Please call me if you have any quesrions about this letter. I very much look forward to representing you in this proceeding. Sincerely, ' e Curran l ~,C~ ~1 ~~,4~.o(,orJ (name) L' l,_.,;_, (title} Orange County Board of Commissioners 3 Date ec: Dr. Gordan Thompson, Institute for Resource and Security Studies Tou~n o f Chape l H i 1 L Fax ~ 919-96?-8406 Jan 13 ' 99 12 ~ 31 P. 03/04 `~ ~THEREAS, the Council understands that Carolina Pawer & Light has plans for the expansion of the high level radioactive waste storage facilities at the Sheacota Harris Nucleax Pawer Plaza in . Wake County; and WHEREAS, the Council understands that there are risks inherent with the doubling of the storage capacity of the temporary storage pools for the high level radioactive waste far. the .purpose of long term storage of high. level radioactive waste, not only from the Shearon Harris ..plant, but also from two other nuclear. power plants from elsewhere in North and South Cazolina; ....and ~J'HEREAS, the Council has concerns about the plans to expand the waste storage capacity at the .Shearon fTarris facility and the lack of public input into the approval process for those; and ~fTHEREAS, the. Council believes that commruuties should consider alteniative forms of energy production that are .safer for the environment; NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT IEtFSOLVED by the Council of the Town of Chapel Hill that the Council requests that the North Carolina Department of ~zzviroztzaezrt and Natural Resources and the Nucleaz Regulatory Commission.conduct puUlic hearings in which Carolina Fower & Light , and appropriate regulatory staff- 1) explain the plans to expand tbe~ storage. facilities for high Ievel radioactive waste at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant; 2} .outline the risks, or lack thereof, and explain the risk assessment methodology employed to develop risk projections related to the use of facilities designed for short term storage of high level radioactive wastes for longterm storage; 3) outline the risks, .or lack thereof, atzd explain~the risk assessment methodology employed to develop risk projections associated with the transportation and handling of materials from other distant nuclear power generating facilities; 4) accept and consider public cozzaments relative to support for or opposition to operating or examining such a facility in this ~azea; 5) explain why transporticxg spent fuel rods ~ is ~ safer than a semi perx~aanezat storage (that is, "swimming pool" storage) onto their site of use, as transpo'ng them increases risks; . 6) explain why transporting spent: fuel mds from two regions of zelativeiy low population . density (South Carolina and $runswick County, l\TC} to an area of much higher population density (Wake County) minimatzes the overall risk to people; and 7) requests that the Chapel Hill Town Council be included in discussions with Carolina Power. and Light and the Orazzge County Commissioners, and that these questions be answered in a public forum. Tou~n of Chapel Hill Fax~919-967-$406 Jan 13 '99 1231 P.04~04 \S '.. BE IT FURTHER RESQ~.VED that the Council opposes any proposed expansion o~ him level radioactive waste storage facilities at CP&L's Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant: . This the 11 ~` day of January, 1999. ~; ,~