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HomeMy WebLinkAboutAgenda - 02-09-1999 - 1INSTITUTE FOR RESOURCE AND SECURITY STUDIES 27 Ellsworth Avenue, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139, USA Phone: (617) 491 -5177 Fax: (617) 491 -6904 Electronic mail: irss @igc.apc.org ILLUSTRATIONS ACCOMPANYING A PRESENTATION M GORDON THOMPSON TO THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ORANGE COUNTY NORTH CAROLINA M 9 FEBRUARY 1999 REGARDING RISKS AND ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH SPENT FUEL STORAGE AT THE SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR PLANT General Layout of the Harris Plant w IESEL FUEL 01L ST04A44 TK bL0] t bAY W � � Z a oe � a I R1b . I r ab' 74 i i EFH 6l ( WA ' J I[W P r j ETKep page 1 OF UNIT 4 FUEL TRANSFER , CONTAINMENT CANALS (NOT CONSTRUCTED) � I Emoo NORTH S POOL B I 21 41 OF UNIT 1 27 CONTAINMENT OF UNIT 3 CONTAINMENT FUEL TRANSFER CANALS (NOT CONSTRUCTED) —� , -- CASK LOA D I T `--- II POOL C ' POOL D POOL 45 73 OF UNIT 2 59 CONTAINMENT (NOT CONSTRUCTED) FIGURE 1.1; HARRIS FUEL HANDLING BUILDING PLAN LAYOUT b ao EQUIPMENT HATCH -N -Y i COLUMN LINEI IDENTIFIERS Typical PWR Fuel Assemblv Rod clu control Top na Control Top view r ��il►�i1��i�i�i�►1i1►1p �i�1 Fuel rod $pnnq Uip -- grid assembly Botlom nozzle page 3 Tvpical BWR Fuel Assembly ASSEMBLY IDENTI NUMBEI UPPER TIE PL ATE FUEL CLAODIN( FUEL ROI INTE RIA SPACEF FUEL CHANNEL LOWE TIE PLAT ZONE page 4 Typical PWR Fuel Storage Rack for Love Density Storage page 5 FIGURE 2.1.1 PICTORIAL VIER OF TYPICAL HARRIS RACK STRUCTURE BI - 971760 page 6 Schematic View of Tvpical Cooling and Cleanup Svstems for a Spent Fuel Pool (LAKE, RIVER, OCEAN, COOLING TOWER, OR COOLING POND) page 7 Core of the Harris Reactor • 157 PWR fuel assemblies • Center - center distance of 8.5 inches Present and Proposed Capacity of the Harris Fuel Pools Pool PWR spaces BWR spaces Total `A' 360 363 723 `B' 768 2178 2946 `C' 927 2763 3690 `D' 1025 0 1025 Total 3080 5304 8384 • Pools A and B now have licensed capacity as listed. • Pools C and D will acquire the listed capacity in five stages. • Center- center distance in pools A and B is 10.5 inches for PWR fuel and 6.25 inches for BWR fuel. • Center - center distance in pools C and D will be 9.0 inches for PWR fuel and 6.25 inches for BWR fuel. page 8 Some Technical Issues Related to Activation of Pools C and D • When the Harris plant was designed, cooling of pools C and D was to be provided by the systems of Unit 2. That unit was never built. • The bounding heat load for pools C and D will be 15.6 million BTU /hour. The component cooling water (CCW) system for Unit 1 cannot accommodate that load. • CP &L's short -term plan (through 2001) is to limit the heat load in pools C and D to 1.0 million BTU /hour, and to exploit the margin in the existing CCW system so as to accommodate that heat load. This plan constitutes an "unreviewed safety question" because the CCW system serves safety functions at the Harris reactor. • CP &L's longer -term plan is to upgrade the CCW system. That upgrade has not yet been designed. • The PWR racks in pools C and D will not be safe against criticality for low- burnup or high- enrichment fuel. • Some quality assurance documentation is not available for completed portions of the cooling system for pools C and D. page 9 Cooling of a Fuel Pool in the Event of Total or Partial Loss of Water POOL WITH NO WATER [Cooling occurs by air convection] POOL WITH RESIDUAL WATER [Convection is suppressed] i page 10 Hazard Potential of the Harris Fuel Pools • A key indicator of hazard is the pools' inventory of cesium -137, which has a half - life of 30 years. • At shutdown the Harris reactor contains about 150,000 TB q (45 kilograms) of cesium -137, in 157 PWR fuel assemblies. • At full capacity, the Harris pools will contain 3,080 PWR assemblies and 5,304 BWR assemblies. A BWR assembly will contain about 1/4 the cesium -137 inventory of a PWR assembly of the same age after discharge. • The 1986 Chernobyl accident released about 90,000 TBq (27 kilograms) of cesium - 137. Official estimates indicate that this exposure will cause 50 -100 thousand extra cancer fatalities worldwide over the next 70 years. page 11 NRC- Approved Dry Spent Fuel Storage Designs Vendor General Nuclear Systems, Incorporated Vectro Technologies, Incorporated Westinghouse Electric Foster Wheeler Energy Applications, Incorporated NAC International NAC International Vectro Technologies, Incorporated Transnuclear, Incorporated NAC International Pacific Sierra Nuclear Associates Vectra Technologies, Incorporated NAC International Storage Design Model Metal Cask CASTOR V /21 Concrete Module NUHOMS-7 Metal Cask MC -10 Concrete Vault Modular Vault Dry Store Metal Cask NAC S/T Metal Cask NAC -C28 S/T Concrete Module NUHOMS -24P Metal Cask TN -24 Metal Cask NAC - 128 /ST VentilatedCask VSC -24 Concrete Module Standardized NUHOMS -24P NUHOMS -52B NAC -STC 21 PWR 7 PWR 24 PWR 83 PWR or 150 BWR OZ-1 ZIA Storage Certificate of Design Compliance Approval Approval Date Date 09/30/1985 03/28/1986 08/17/1990 09/30/1987 08/17/1990 03/22/1988 03/29/1988 08/17/1990 28 Canisters 09/29/1988 08/17/1990 (fuel rods from 56 PWR assemblies) 24 PWR 04/21/1989 24 PWR 07/05/1989 11 1041 1993 28 PWR 02/01/1990 24 PWR 03/29/1991 05/07/1993 24 PWR N/A 01/23/1995 52 BWR 26 PWR 07/18/95 page 12 NRC Dry Spent Fuel Storage licensees Reactor Name Date Storage Utility Idled Vendor Model Surry 1, 2 General Nuclear Metal Cask Virginia Electric & 07/02/1986 Systems, CASTOR V /21 Power Company Incorporated H. B. Robinson 2 Carolina Power & Light Company Oconee 1, 2, 3 Duke Power Company Fort St. Vrain Public Service Company of Colorado Calvert Cliffs It 2 Baltimore Gas & Electric Company Palisades Consumer Power Company Prairie Island 1, 2 Northern States Power Company Point Beach Wisconsin Electric and Power Company Davis -Besse Toledo Edison Company 08/13/1986 01/29/1990 11/04/1991 11/25/1992 Under General License 10/19/1993 Under General License Under General License Vectra Technologies, Incorporated Vectra Technologies, Incorporated Foster Wheeler Energy Applications, Incorprated Vectra Technologies, Incorporated Pacific Sierra Nuclear Associates Transnuclear, Incorporated Pacific Sierra Nuclear Associates VECTRA Techologies Incorporated Concrete Module NUHOMS -7 Concrete Module NUHOMS -24P Modular Vault Dry Store Concrete Module NUHOMS -24P Ventilated Cask VSC -24 Metal Cask TN -40 Ventilated Concrete VSC -24 Concrete Module NUHOMS -24P page 13 NC WARN SUPPORTS NUKE WASTE STORAGE NEAR JORDAN LAKE! REACTOR SITE STORAGE: SAFER, SMARTER, CHEAPER THAN A DUMP The NC Authority and most of the media have acted as if there is no alternative to waste burial, reciting the familiar line, "Well, it has to go somewhere ". For years, Physicians for Social Responsibility/ Triangle Chapter and NC WARN have pressed the state'to consider an alternative to the 7 -state dump planned for central North Carolina. These groups and many scientists call for all "low- level" nuclear wastes (LLRW) to be stored in above- ground, moni- tored vaults at nuclear power plants. In 1993 UNC -CH's Dr. Douglas Crawford - Brown, an expert on risk analysis and health effects from radiation, told the NC Legislature: "The state should examine the economic and political feasi- bility of tying disposal of LLRW to the eventual fate of nuclear power facilities producing the waste ... and the feasibility of constructing suitable on -site facilities." His advice has been ignored. THIS ARTICLE APPEARED IN AN UNDATED NC WARN DOCUMENT! THE ARTICLE III FOUNDATION (919) 774 -1904 171 continued - page No. D. Industrial Process;.n; ci Isctopes and Production of Compounds E. Radiation Detection Instruments ............... 6 F. AEC Production and Service Facilities .......... 10 G. radioisotope Research Support Program ......... 13 H. medical Uses of Radioisotopes ...�,........,,.� 13 I. Clinical Applications ..,,,,,,,,,,,,,..,,,,,,,,' 16 J. Agricultural Uses of Radioisotopes 18 VIII. Manpower A. Current Activities ....... ...................... 2 Be- Planned Future Activities ... ...............:. 9 IX. Health and Safety A� Hazards of Operation ................... ......, 1 B. Waste Disposal .................. 10 C. Insurance ...............e. ................... 19 D. Research in Reactor Safety and Radiation Protection 29 X. Patents A. Section 152 - Commission Contracts............. 1 Be Section 153 - Compulsory Licensing ,.,,.,,,,,,, 3 C. Filing of Foreign Patents ........... ......'..,.. 4 D. !Rules and Regulations . .............,,,,,,',.,,, 5 'S v i CjV2 AAM� �• � /Iorvr4f6 1,k INSURANCE v° Nature and Extent of the Risks Another factor of great importance and interest to the private atomic energy industry is that of insur- ance protection in the operation of nuclear facilities. The risks involving damage or injury at the site of the facility appear to be of the type normally covered by the insurance industry. The primary problem, however, arises from the fact that there exists a remote possibility of a catastrophe which could be substantially more serious than any visualized in other types of industrial opera- tions. That this potential is remote is illustrated by the fact that the Commission's reactor operations re- cently reached the sizeable total of 700,000 hours of reactor operation without occurrence of any serious ac- cidents. Under comparable conditions there would be, therefore, only a small probability of very extensive claims for damage against reactor operators, the manu- facturers of reactor equipment and their insurers. This experience record, the research and development work under- way by Commissionts laboratories and other organizations, and the rigorous review of hazard problems in connection with the licensing of atomic energy facilities as described earlier, all support the conclusion as to the remoteness 19 (c) Loss of use insurance: This "presents a difficult insurance problem during the period of early development of industrial atomic power. If any such protection is available it will be somewhat limited in amount." (d) Workments Compensation_ insurance: "The wo- kments compensation hazard can be handled by existing insurance facilities." (e) Public Liability insurance: "The public liability hazards resulting from damage to persons or property can be insured by existing in- surance facilities up to the limits of liability normally available to more hazardous types of in- dustrial enterprises." However, the field of third - party liability presents "the most serious problem as to the amount of insurance available" as a re- sult of "the very high aggregate dollar amount of claims which might arise in the event of a possible, though not necessarily probable, catastrophic acci- dent." In addition to these conclusions, the Study Group (a) noted that "The catastrophe potential, although remote, is more serious than anything now known in industry ", and (b) declined, as not properly its function, "to determine whether 24 or not legislation should be proposed under which the Govern - ment might assume liabilities in excess of those" covered by private insurance. Views of Industry on Study Group Report Subsequent to the date of the Interim Report, the Division of Civilian Application requested comments.from interested industrial concerns with respect to the groupts general conclusions. Seven responses were received. The general view expressed in the comments received was to the effect that while it was probable that adequate insurance would be available for other types of risks, the conclusions did not provide assurance that adequate coverage in the field of third -party liability would be made avail- able. Members of the atomic energy industry have steadily maintained this position;.thus, for example, a representa- tive of the equipment manufacturers, speaking before the annual meeting of the American Bar Association in August, 1955, stated with reference to the Study Group report that it now appears unlikely that the private insurance industry will ever be able to assume the full risk of atomic acci- dents. Similarly, the vice president and general manager of the Atomic Products Division, General Electric Company, speaking before the Atomic Industrial Forum in September 1955, advanced the position that, in spite of the Study 25 Group's report, insurance still represents a significant roadblock in America's progress in the power reactor field. Liability Insurance Pool Since the date of their interim report, the members of the Study Group have translated their general conclu- sions into specific amounts of insurance. This has neces- sitated the formation of pool arrangements of both the cap- ital stock casualty companies and the mutual companies and the formation of an underwriting syndicate. At a meeting of the Insurance Study Group held on January 31, 1956, it was reported that with respect to third - party liability the syndicate of stock companies will be ready to provide 50 million dollars coverage foreach insured project and that the mutual companies will be prepared to provide coverage in the amount of 10 million dollars. This amount of coverage is more than double the amount of coverage written in any known single instance in the history of liability insurance. In spite of this, however, the indications are that this amount will not be deemed adequate by the atomic energy industry to cover the "conceivable catastrophe ". At recent meetings of industry advisory groups with the Division of Civilian Application, the majority view expressed was to the effect that nothing short of complete protection of corporate assets would be deemed adequate. 26 Co_nCjUd.inq: Comm_en y o... ra= eration of a position with respect to n.,_� government excess- coverage insurance must proceed from certal.n basic premises: ia) The amount of liability coverage to be made available by private insurers will be un- precedented in amount. gib) The expressed desire of the atomic energv industry to be protected to the extent of corporate assets on an open -ended basis �ac�s ±...e problem out of the C'.^,Yite! <_t Of 1n- sur ._ce as generally applied in other fields, s >r_'iere some measures of calculated risk are �a%:. n in connection with maximum conceivable 103Ee3 T'h?re is at present no so,and bas -= uccr_ industry can esilmiate the e_x enz J; IIIS ns'a.rance needs, due to lack of oTDerating ex -e- rience to farm the bass for both the oroba- yities of an a,�c_de. , and an estimate o_ `he - _n _ is that protection = excess of from. va- e in3urer s Is needed (in the sense � ^,'?r, the- lac_ O.f excess coverage constitutes a i r r. / TTAT Vl�IC� CH �`- deterrent to full industrial participation) , several im- portant problems will remain: (a) What type of government assistance is most desirable? The ;hoice here seems limited to three forms of assistance: direct government excess- coverage insurance, general indemnity, or limitation of liability combined with public protection through a disaster insurance plant. (b) If excess coverage insurance seems de- sirable, what basis will be used in determining the rates to be charged? To date, no definitive rate studies have been undertaken by the private -�} insurers, and the indications are that initially each project will be evaluated separately with respect to the cost of coverage. (c) Should there be an upper limit on the amount of government assistance provided and if so what factors are available for consideration in setting the limit? Need for Legislation The Commission is giving continuous attention to the various aspects of this important problem but has not yet reached a conclusion as to whether government insur- ance will be needed. M., MBOMOU �) RESEARCH IN REACTOR SAFETY AND RADIATION PROTECTION Reactor Safety During 1955, a series of tests was initiated to determine the safe operating limits of reactors of various classes and to investigate the mechanisms that contribute to inherent reactor safety. Data on heterogeneous reactors is being developed as part of the Special Power Excursion 1 Reactor Tests (SPERT) by the Phillips Petroleum Company at the National Reactor Testing Station in Idaho. Power transient tests on small homogeneous reactors, Kinetic Experiments on Water Boiler reactors (KEWB) are being con- ducted by North American Aviation, Inc., at Santa Susana, (� California. Reactor safety experiments which can be carried out without the use of a nuclear reactor are termed out-of- pile tests. Out -of -pile tests are now being carried on as follows: North American Aviation Inc. is conducting a fuse development program in order to design simple safety mechanisms which can b-e built into a re- actor to protect it against power surges. The Aerojet General Corporation is measuring the energy release of the possible reaction of 29 Proposed Motions by the Orange County Board of Commissioners if the Commissioners Decided to Take Action on the Following Matters Motion 1- Request for Hearing/Petition to Intervene Move that the BOCC direct the consultants, Dr. Gordon Thompson and Diane Curran, to: a) complete the legal and technical documents required to file a request to intervene in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's permitting process for the CP &L proposal to expand its storage capacity for spent nuclear fuel rods at the Shearon Harris nuclear power plant; and b) file those documents with the NRC prior to the filing deadline and end of the public comment period on February 12, 1999. Intervention is the formal process whereby Orange County asks the NRC to hold a public hearing on the proposal. Motion 2 - Challenge to the Proposed Finding of "No Significant Hazard" Move that the BOCC direct the consultants, Dr. Gordon Thompson and Diane Curran, to: a) complete the legal and technical documents required to file a challenge or objection to the NRC staff s proposed finding of "No Significant Hazard" relative the CP &L proposal to expand its storage capacity for spent nuclear fuel rods at the Shearon Harris nuclear power plant; and b) file those documents with the NRC prior to the filing deadline and end of the public comment period on February 12, 1999.